The Mishna is instructing how to determine if various physical defects make an animal permanently impure and ineligible to be sacrificed while still being permitted for non-sacred consumption. At one point Rabbi Akiva suggests a method of checking a particular defect, in which a lamb seems to have only one testicle. The Gemara then brings a story of a case in which his method was used, yet after slaughtering the lamb it turned out the second testicle was there all along, only not visible. Rabbi Akiva permitted the animal to be eaten, while Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri forbade the animal to be eaten (as a fistrborn it should have been given to a cohen). This led to a sharp excahnge between the two rabbis:
Rabbi Akiva to Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri: how long are you going to waste the money of [the people of] Israel?
Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri to Rabbi Akiva: how long are you going to feed forbidden carcasses to Israel?
the original Hebrew is more pithy:
עד מתי אתה מכלה ממונם של ישראל?
עד מתי אתה מאכיל את ישראל נבילות?
Both scholars start from the same set of facts: the lamb seemed to have a defect, Akiva's proposed method of checking was used and proved the defect was permanent, and the animal was slaughtered based on that tested proposition. Then, they both agree, an external fact, unknowable at the moment of slaughter, was revealed. They differ on the ultimate outcome. Is doing your best enough? Is there an objective commandment which supercedes informed intentions? Do social considerations trump (unknowable) facts? Is there a legal truth which overrides all social measures and intentions?
This deliberation is exactly as fresh today as it was two thousand years ago when Akiva and Yochanan had their altercation; each side brings a set of values which precedes their interpretation of the law and informs it. It's the reason there can be no permanent, immutable and universal legal system: every legal system has to reflect the values of the society which legislated it and applies it and adapts it as the underlying values change.
B'chorot 40a.
If you've never visited this blog before, well, now it's too late; I've stopped blogging as described here.
Showing posts with label International Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label International Law. Show all posts
Friday, December 30, 2011
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Politics Trump Treaties
In the summer of 2005 America and Europe wanted Israel's disengagement from Gaza to be complete. It was really important to them. So by way of convincing Israel there'd be no danger in opening the border between Gaza and Egypt, everyone signed a treaty. The Americans signed, the EU signed, Egypt signed, Israel signed, and the PA signed. The treaty described how European professionals would watch the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza, and they'd be nice to the Palestinians but also protect Israel's interests.
Then, about six months later, Hamas won the Palestinian elections and it all started unraveling. By the time Hamas violently threw the PA security forces out of Gaza, nothing was left of the treaty. This week, less than six years later, a new Egyptian regime (a temporary one, perhaps) opened its border with Gaza, and no-one even pretends to respect the defunct treaty, nor to care.
Meanwhile, far away in Africa, Sudan is using military force to change its border with the emerging country of South Sudan. If you look hard enough you can find mention of this at well-informed websites such as the Economist; the Guardian has even mentioned it repeatedly (here, here, here and here). So far as I see, words such as "illegal according to international law" or their synonyms don't make it into any of these reports; though here's a blogger who's pretty explicit about what's going on. A blogger. At one point the Guardian does use the term "disputed territory", however, thereby demonstrating that there's at least one keyboard in their system that has the keys necessary for such words.
Just another example among many that international law may be useful when peaceful democratic states suchas Iceland and Britain need to resolve disagreements about fishing rights in the Northern Atlantic, but it's useless when coping with international conflicts.
My point, of course, is not to bemoan the irrelevance of international law; on the contrary, my position is that international law needn't be brought into armed conflicts in the first place, not as a tool for resolving them. The mere fact that they're violent proves that at least one side is willing to kill so as to promote their interests, so why would they be frightened off by some words in a dusty book on a shelf. National interests are what makes international relations happen, not laws.
Then, about six months later, Hamas won the Palestinian elections and it all started unraveling. By the time Hamas violently threw the PA security forces out of Gaza, nothing was left of the treaty. This week, less than six years later, a new Egyptian regime (a temporary one, perhaps) opened its border with Gaza, and no-one even pretends to respect the defunct treaty, nor to care.
Meanwhile, far away in Africa, Sudan is using military force to change its border with the emerging country of South Sudan. If you look hard enough you can find mention of this at well-informed websites such as the Economist; the Guardian has even mentioned it repeatedly (here, here, here and here). So far as I see, words such as "illegal according to international law" or their synonyms don't make it into any of these reports; though here's a blogger who's pretty explicit about what's going on. A blogger. At one point the Guardian does use the term "disputed territory", however, thereby demonstrating that there's at least one keyboard in their system that has the keys necessary for such words.
Just another example among many that international law may be useful when peaceful democratic states suchas Iceland and Britain need to resolve disagreements about fishing rights in the Northern Atlantic, but it's useless when coping with international conflicts.
My point, of course, is not to bemoan the irrelevance of international law; on the contrary, my position is that international law needn't be brought into armed conflicts in the first place, not as a tool for resolving them. The mere fact that they're violent proves that at least one side is willing to kill so as to promote their interests, so why would they be frightened off by some words in a dusty book on a shelf. National interests are what makes international relations happen, not laws.
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Return of the Nerds
Here are a few links to articles about how Israelis are working to make their country stronger, or to withstand this onslaught or that, and in general things that demonstrate why Israel is not weakening.
The techies are convening. I was at one of these conferences last year, and was tickled to see all the translations into Chinese, and the Indians who got along fine with English. Didn't see may Egyptians, tho, nor even many Europeans. These folks are one of the many reasons why a boycott of Israel, or sanctions against it, won't work.
The lawyers are revving up. No-one in their sane mind thinks there's a pure legal case against Israel and its occupation and its borders. Clearly, most of the people who talk about what's legal and what's not don't know a thing about law, and care far less. The whole thing is and always was a political matter, not a legal one. Still, it's nice to see a group of lawyers play the game from Israel's perspective for once:
The Money printers strike again: I've already linked to this elsewhere, but it's worth pointing out again. The reason the Hamas government in Gaza still uses the Shekel for its currency isn't because of an evil Israeli occupation. It's because they've got no better alternative. (h/t Andre)
The techies are convening. I was at one of these conferences last year, and was tickled to see all the translations into Chinese, and the Indians who got along fine with English. Didn't see may Egyptians, tho, nor even many Europeans. These folks are one of the many reasons why a boycott of Israel, or sanctions against it, won't work.
The lawyers are revving up. No-one in their sane mind thinks there's a pure legal case against Israel and its occupation and its borders. Clearly, most of the people who talk about what's legal and what's not don't know a thing about law, and care far less. The whole thing is and always was a political matter, not a legal one. Still, it's nice to see a group of lawyers play the game from Israel's perspective for once:
8. While the UN has maintained a persistent policy of non-recognition ofDanny Gordis strikes again: Danny was invited to speak to a J-Street leadership group on their recent trip to Israel. Since he's not a government official, he can meet them without any implications of any sort - so he did. And told them how odd they appear, and how arrogant, and how unfriendly. Looks to me like he washed the floor with them, though I doubt they saw it that way.
Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem pending a negotiated solution, despite
Israel's historic rights to the city, it is inconceivable that the UN would
now recognize a unilaterally declared Palestinian state, the borders of
which would include eastern Jerusalem. This would represent the
ultimate in hypocrisy, double standards and discrimination, as well as an
utter disregard of the rights of Israel and the Jewish People.
The Money printers strike again: I've already linked to this elsewhere, but it's worth pointing out again. The reason the Hamas government in Gaza still uses the Shekel for its currency isn't because of an evil Israeli occupation. It's because they've got no better alternative. (h/t Andre)
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
The B'Tselem Witch Trials
I continue to be offline, sorry for the inconvenience. In the meantime, here's an interesting article about a subject I often write about. Noah Pollak takes a long hard look at B'Tselem.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
The Hubris of the International Lawmongers
Here's a very short and necessarily superficial summary of the theory of lawmaking in modern democratic societies.
The people are sovereign, or rather the broad section of the people which comprises the electorate. The electorate periodically chooses its representatives and sends them to the legislature. The legislature legislates: it debates, formulates and passes laws, which thus express a rough approximation of the people's will. The laws are sent out into the real world, where they are tested, refined, and elaborated through a complex process of decrees, practice, litigation and adjudication, and general public discussion, not in any particular order. On the contrary, this is a permanent multi-layered process. Decrees are promulgated by the executive, which is itself subordinate to the sovereign people; adjudication is done, obviously, by judges, and they too are subordinate to the electorate either because they must deal with the law as legislated, or through the mode of their appointment, or through whatever channels each democratic society chooses to control its judges. Ultimately much of the ongoing creation of the law and its application reflect moral values as they're defined by each society. Does it prefer to encourage risk taking over security, say, or how it chooses to allocate its limited resources. Successfully functioning democratic societies strive towards a common ground, a rough consensus around which most members can coalesce, and they navigate inevitable changes in social mores, technology, and all the myriad other things that change and evolve over time, in an approximation of general agreement. Societies which cannot roughly agree, because they're too diverse or haven't agreed on principles of managing legislation and its evolution, run the danger of disintegration or worse.
Telegraphic summary of the summary: the sovereign people figure out how they wish to organize their particular society and how they wish it to evolve, and their institutions strive to express this agreement.
International law doesn't have a sovereign, and worse, it doesn't have a universally accepted notion of priorities, mores, or institutions to express them. True, there are valiant attempts to pretend otherwise, and over the past half century or so they've grown ever more valiant. These include the creation of international institutions with a cursory appearance of democratic institutions such as a parliament, an executive and courts. There is a conceit whereby there's a set of fundamental documents which define universal mores, and these documents enjoy democratic legitimacy since they've been ratified by national institutions such as parliaments or governments. Yet the obvious fact that most of the parliaments or governments which did the ratifying were themselves not democratic should give us pause; the lack of credible accountable institutions for applying and evolving the old fundamental documents ought to convince that the entire system may be a noble and well-intentioned attempt, but it's not remotely possibly successful. Nor can it be: the idea of having a sovereign electorate is to preserve its power to change its mind. Almost by definition different societies will change their minds in different directions: because they're different.
An interesting example rarely mentioned in such discussions but which I have seen close up many times is the availability of archival documentation. Roughly speaking, American archivists reflect the will of their society by assuming documentation should be thrown open to public scrutiny as much as possible. Europeans, meanwhile, and especially Germans, are far more wary. Neither side is "right", and both sides have reached their present positions through an understanding of their respective histories; since the histories are very different, so is the legislation. Anyone who reads newspapers perceptively can easily put together their own long list of other examples. This is inevitable, it reflects the human condition, and it should be celebrated not bemoaned.
Unless you're of the opinion that there's a set of universal rules in which one size fits all. To an extent, the European Union project sort of takes this position - but the extreme reluctance to let in the Muslim Turks or the impoverished and hardly democratic Ukrainians demonstrates loud and clear that the EU project isn't universal, it's merely European, and can include only those societies who can be trusted to agree to the same broad consensus. I expect it will take another century or three to know if this can work even in Europe. Imagine trying to incorporate the US and you see how silly the conceit of universality is; then think of China or Russia. Heh.
None of which stops folks from pretending. The German Der Spiegel magazine, for example:
Kress isn't important as an individual. I'm criticizing him because he represents a widely accepted Weltanschauung.
Kenneth Roth agrees, but takes the hubris a very important step forward. Roth is an American, so on one level he, unlike Kress, is a legitimate participant in the American discussion of how America should deal with its enemies. Yet Roth doesn't refer to American law, rather to international law; actually, he doesn't refer to law at all, rather to a philosophical principle which he adheres to and demands that all the rest of us do, too:
It's tempting simply to write people like Kress and Roth off as kooks. Sadly, Kress represents a widely accepted theology in Europe, and Roth has an impressive cachet in some circles in America; they are supported by many very cynical governments who have very limited patience with their sentiments when it comes to their own societies, but find the appeal of intervening on the sovereignty of other lands irresistible Feeling superior at the expense of America is fun; garnering points from the large Muslim contingent at the UN by rigorously applying these notions to Israel is painless. On that level, it's hard to know if Roth is a knave or a dupe. Knave for propagating a crooked and anti-democratic system, dupe for being the tool of hard, undemocratic and unscrupulous regimes. I expect he's both.
Update: Apropos theology, the Archbishop of Canterbury joins the chorus.
The people are sovereign, or rather the broad section of the people which comprises the electorate. The electorate periodically chooses its representatives and sends them to the legislature. The legislature legislates: it debates, formulates and passes laws, which thus express a rough approximation of the people's will. The laws are sent out into the real world, where they are tested, refined, and elaborated through a complex process of decrees, practice, litigation and adjudication, and general public discussion, not in any particular order. On the contrary, this is a permanent multi-layered process. Decrees are promulgated by the executive, which is itself subordinate to the sovereign people; adjudication is done, obviously, by judges, and they too are subordinate to the electorate either because they must deal with the law as legislated, or through the mode of their appointment, or through whatever channels each democratic society chooses to control its judges. Ultimately much of the ongoing creation of the law and its application reflect moral values as they're defined by each society. Does it prefer to encourage risk taking over security, say, or how it chooses to allocate its limited resources. Successfully functioning democratic societies strive towards a common ground, a rough consensus around which most members can coalesce, and they navigate inevitable changes in social mores, technology, and all the myriad other things that change and evolve over time, in an approximation of general agreement. Societies which cannot roughly agree, because they're too diverse or haven't agreed on principles of managing legislation and its evolution, run the danger of disintegration or worse.
Telegraphic summary of the summary: the sovereign people figure out how they wish to organize their particular society and how they wish it to evolve, and their institutions strive to express this agreement.
International law doesn't have a sovereign, and worse, it doesn't have a universally accepted notion of priorities, mores, or institutions to express them. True, there are valiant attempts to pretend otherwise, and over the past half century or so they've grown ever more valiant. These include the creation of international institutions with a cursory appearance of democratic institutions such as a parliament, an executive and courts. There is a conceit whereby there's a set of fundamental documents which define universal mores, and these documents enjoy democratic legitimacy since they've been ratified by national institutions such as parliaments or governments. Yet the obvious fact that most of the parliaments or governments which did the ratifying were themselves not democratic should give us pause; the lack of credible accountable institutions for applying and evolving the old fundamental documents ought to convince that the entire system may be a noble and well-intentioned attempt, but it's not remotely possibly successful. Nor can it be: the idea of having a sovereign electorate is to preserve its power to change its mind. Almost by definition different societies will change their minds in different directions: because they're different.
An interesting example rarely mentioned in such discussions but which I have seen close up many times is the availability of archival documentation. Roughly speaking, American archivists reflect the will of their society by assuming documentation should be thrown open to public scrutiny as much as possible. Europeans, meanwhile, and especially Germans, are far more wary. Neither side is "right", and both sides have reached their present positions through an understanding of their respective histories; since the histories are very different, so is the legislation. Anyone who reads newspapers perceptively can easily put together their own long list of other examples. This is inevitable, it reflects the human condition, and it should be celebrated not bemoaned.
Unless you're of the opinion that there's a set of universal rules in which one size fits all. To an extent, the European Union project sort of takes this position - but the extreme reluctance to let in the Muslim Turks or the impoverished and hardly democratic Ukrainians demonstrates loud and clear that the EU project isn't universal, it's merely European, and can include only those societies who can be trusted to agree to the same broad consensus. I expect it will take another century or three to know if this can work even in Europe. Imagine trying to incorporate the US and you see how silly the conceit of universality is; then think of China or Russia. Heh.
None of which stops folks from pretending. The German Der Spiegel magazine, for example:
What is just about killing a feared terrorist in his home in the middle of Pakistan? For the families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks, and for patriotic Americans who saw their grand nation challenged by a band of criminals, the answer might be simple. But international law experts, who have been grappling with the question of the legal status of the US-led war on terror for years, find Obama's pithy words on Sunday night more problematic. Claus Kress, an international law professor at the University of Cologne, argues that achieving retributive justice for crimes, difficult as that may be, is "not achieved through summary executions, but through a punishment that is meted out at the end of a trial." Kress says the normal way of handling a man who is sought globally for commissioning murder would be to arrest him, put him on trial and ultimately convict him. In the context of international law, military force can be used in the arrest of a suspect, and this may entail gun fire or situations of self-defense that, in the end, leave no other possibility than to kill a highly dangerous and highly suspicious person. These developments can also lead to tragic and inevitable escalations of the justice process.[my emphasis]Translation: Claus Kress and other unnamed self-appointed legal experts trump the sovereign will of the American people. It's not historical fact that punishment can be meted out only via trials, so Kress can't be talking history. He's talking law, or anyway he thinks he is. Except that of course he's not, since he allows no room for an adaptation of law to new circumstances. Nor does he grant the American people the right or legitimacy to fashion their own response to a new situation. If the murder of 3000 people in New York is hiding in Pakistan, America may not chose the manner it will deal with him, rather it must do what Claus Kress says, since he represents a higher justice than the mere will of the American people. Moreover, his interpretation trumps theirs, since he knows he's right. And of course, Claus Kress is against capital punishment, as most Europeans are, and the international court he's referring to has no capital punishment on its books, so there's no way in which the Americans could have legally caused the death of Osama Bin Laden unless he was shooting at American policemen with a legal arrest warrant.
Kress isn't important as an individual. I'm criticizing him because he represents a widely accepted Weltanschauung.
Kenneth Roth agrees, but takes the hubris a very important step forward. Roth is an American, so on one level he, unlike Kress, is a legitimate participant in the American discussion of how America should deal with its enemies. Yet Roth doesn't refer to American law, rather to international law; actually, he doesn't refer to law at all, rather to a philosophical principle which he adheres to and demands that all the rest of us do, too:
It's not "justice" for him to be killed even if justified; no trial, conviction.What makes this statement positively comic is that it came in a tweet in which he rebutted the Secretary General of - are you sitting? - The United Nations! Ban ki Moon, you see, had just announced his satisfaction at the death of Osama bin Laden. Roth then turned to the American government and demanded:
White House still hasn't clarified: OBL "resisted" but how did he pose lethal threat to US forces on scene? Need factsIt's a fine thing that individual citizens can place demands on their government. It's an essential part of democracy. What's so repulsive is the strident demand that a democratically elected government justify its actions - pronto! - to an unelected, and very much unelectable private individual who sees himself as superior to the democratic process of his country, in the name of an undemocratic system which lacks all the elements of a living legal system.
It's tempting simply to write people like Kress and Roth off as kooks. Sadly, Kress represents a widely accepted theology in Europe, and Roth has an impressive cachet in some circles in America; they are supported by many very cynical governments who have very limited patience with their sentiments when it comes to their own societies, but find the appeal of intervening on the sovereignty of other lands irresistible Feeling superior at the expense of America is fun; garnering points from the large Muslim contingent at the UN by rigorously applying these notions to Israel is painless. On that level, it's hard to know if Roth is a knave or a dupe. Knave for propagating a crooked and anti-democratic system, dupe for being the tool of hard, undemocratic and unscrupulous regimes. I expect he's both.
Update: Apropos theology, the Archbishop of Canterbury joins the chorus.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Bin Laden Still Popular in Israel's Neighborhood
Yesterday I linked to the story about the Hamas Prime Minster, no less, who condemned America's killing of Bin Laden. Meanwhile he has been joined by others. The Al-Aqsa martyrs Brigades - that's Fatah, if you keep track of such matters, not Hamas; Fatah as in Mahmoud Abbas - published a long statement condemning the killing and calling it a catastrophe. And no, the explanation that it's Fatah's military wing, not its political wing, is not helpful. These people are claiming the right to a sovereign state, for crying out loud; would we brush off a separate foreign policy of the Syrians, say? The Russians? Karl Vick, a journalist not known for Zionist inclinations, wandered around Ramallah yesterday and found some support for Bin Laden even after his death, though of course Vick allows the supporters to explain it's Israel's fault. An imam in El Aksa mosque told Obama he'd soon be hanged for his crime of killing Bin Laden. The Economist, a bit more cool-headed, reports that support for Bin Laden among Palestinians has declined over recent years from 70% in 2003 to a mere third not long before he was killed. How reassuring.
Over in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers have also lined up on the wrong side of the current discussion. Something to keep in mind the next time a clueless media type assures us the Brotherhood is eager to be an Egyptian version of a European Christian Democratic party or some such silliness.
Of course, the Europeans weren't all unanimously overjoyed by the killing either, though not because they liked Bin Laden; rather, it seems there's a significant constituency in Europe for the idea that extra-judicial killings are always wrong, no matter what the circumstances. This is not at all the same as Muslim support for Bin Laden, but it does help explain why too many Europeans can't get their heads around the facts of Islamism. There are other facts they can't comprehend, either, because they don't fit the paradigm of how the world ought to be, which makes explaining Israel's positions largely impossible to such people. Personally, I think the sentiment that there's an international system of law which overrides anything else and must dictate everyone's behavior, is quaint at best on the day after the world's most powerful nation has just demonstrated it doesn't accept the idea: if not the US, and certainly not many others, what might be the source of authority for such talk except wistful thinking?
But I digress.
Too many Palestinians and others in Israel's neighborhood are firmly on the wrong side in the war between the Islamists and humanity. They are the enemy. This has to be clear, and the myriad attempts to obfuscate it must be countered. At the same time, the fact that too many Palestinians support humanity's enemies is not a justification for building more settlements on the West Bank, nor must it inevitably dictate that Israel needs to assist the Palestinians in their war against us by sitting on them and granting them perpetual propaganda victories for their victimhood. It doesn't even mean that the Palestinians can't have a state, such as everybody else has.
Thinking adults in a democracy can be - must be - expected to be capable of holding contradictory thoughts simultaneously.
(Short addendum: the strange people who inhabit the Mondoweiss universe are deeply troubled by the killing of Bin Laden. The reason this is significant is that it demonstrates how far from any type of American normality these folks are; this probably means their extreme aversion to Israel is just as far removed, and just as unlikely ever to have a politically significant public).
Over in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers have also lined up on the wrong side of the current discussion. Something to keep in mind the next time a clueless media type assures us the Brotherhood is eager to be an Egyptian version of a European Christian Democratic party or some such silliness.
Of course, the Europeans weren't all unanimously overjoyed by the killing either, though not because they liked Bin Laden; rather, it seems there's a significant constituency in Europe for the idea that extra-judicial killings are always wrong, no matter what the circumstances. This is not at all the same as Muslim support for Bin Laden, but it does help explain why too many Europeans can't get their heads around the facts of Islamism. There are other facts they can't comprehend, either, because they don't fit the paradigm of how the world ought to be, which makes explaining Israel's positions largely impossible to such people. Personally, I think the sentiment that there's an international system of law which overrides anything else and must dictate everyone's behavior, is quaint at best on the day after the world's most powerful nation has just demonstrated it doesn't accept the idea: if not the US, and certainly not many others, what might be the source of authority for such talk except wistful thinking?
But I digress.
Too many Palestinians and others in Israel's neighborhood are firmly on the wrong side in the war between the Islamists and humanity. They are the enemy. This has to be clear, and the myriad attempts to obfuscate it must be countered. At the same time, the fact that too many Palestinians support humanity's enemies is not a justification for building more settlements on the West Bank, nor must it inevitably dictate that Israel needs to assist the Palestinians in their war against us by sitting on them and granting them perpetual propaganda victories for their victimhood. It doesn't even mean that the Palestinians can't have a state, such as everybody else has.
Thinking adults in a democracy can be - must be - expected to be capable of holding contradictory thoughts simultaneously.
(Short addendum: the strange people who inhabit the Mondoweiss universe are deeply troubled by the killing of Bin Laden. The reason this is significant is that it demonstrates how far from any type of American normality these folks are; this probably means their extreme aversion to Israel is just as far removed, and just as unlikely ever to have a politically significant public).
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
The Ironic Tragedy of Human Rights
Charles Blattberg responded to my post about how international law has not created world peace or anything remotely like it, by e-mailing a link to an article he wrote attempting to explain why this is so. The abstract is here, you can download the entire article at a link in the upper left corner. I admit it's too philosophical for my abilities, though it seems he's writing about a tension which the Talmud resolved some 1800 years ago with the simple statement: "The poor of your town and the poor of another town, the poor of your town come first".
This probably also means the Talmud disagrees with The Guardian, but there's not much novelty in that thought.
This probably also means the Talmud disagrees with The Guardian, but there's not much novelty in that thought.
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Guardian: International Law has Created World Peace
Norm pokes fun at a Guardian leader here. Always a worthy pastime, even if it's not a hard one. So I went and read the piece he finds so sloppy, and noticed an additional oddity in the article:
This seems to indicate that abolishing the United Nations and discarding international law might dramatically reduce human suffering. At any rate, that's the plausible outcome if you concur with the Guardian that there's any connection whatsoever between the UN and international law on the one hand, and the human propensity to warfare on the other.
The current attorney general would do well to remember the damage done during the Iraq affair, when dubious interpretations of resolution 1441 were used to license the course the superpower was already set on. This created the sense that the UN's role was a fraud. Whether it has been right or wrong on Libya, it has proved capable of shared resolve, and shown it can have teeth. The new language of regime change may leave the council descending into accusations of bad faith – and the planet slipping back into a more lawless world. [my emphasis].If I understand the argument, it seems to be saying that the rise of the UN and international law have made the world a more lawful, and thus more peaceful, place. I suppose this might seem compelling to an egotistical ignoramus in Europe, but does it bear any relation to the human condition? I didn't think so, and did a spot of digging around - well, about 30 seconds of digging, to be precise. Google directed me to this list of the wars of the 20th century, which seems to be hinting that there were more than twice as many wars worldwide in the half century since the foundation of the United Nations as in the half century preceding its creation.
This seems to indicate that abolishing the United Nations and discarding international law might dramatically reduce human suffering. At any rate, that's the plausible outcome if you concur with the Guardian that there's any connection whatsoever between the UN and international law on the one hand, and the human propensity to warfare on the other.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
The UNSC, the International Community, and the Media are Worse than Useless
The Washington Post yesterday carried a story about how Israel claims the Hizballah has built hundreds of military targets in Lebanese towns and villages all across Southern Lebanon.
Note that the paper didn't lift a finger to attempt to validate or disprove the story. Validation is apparently no longer part of the journalist ethos. Israel says yes, Hizballah says - well, it doesn't really say - and us journalists, what are we supposed to do? Send someone to poke around and try to report from the area? Inconceivable.
Note further that there's no mention in the news item of Security Council Decision 1701, which specifically proscribed the re-armament of Hizballah in this area. There's likewise no mention of the legality or illegality of storing rockets in folks' basements and garages. The Washington Post doesn't do "illegal according to international law".
Finally, note that Israel received a solemn and official promise from the International Community as expressed by its highest authority, the UNSC, in August 2006, and the promise was promptly broken and almost immediately forgotten. Keep this all in mind next time you hear some fool or prime minister or president or whomever chattering on about the risks Israel absolutely MUST take for the sake of peace.
Note that the paper didn't lift a finger to attempt to validate or disprove the story. Validation is apparently no longer part of the journalist ethos. Israel says yes, Hizballah says - well, it doesn't really say - and us journalists, what are we supposed to do? Send someone to poke around and try to report from the area? Inconceivable.
Note further that there's no mention in the news item of Security Council Decision 1701, which specifically proscribed the re-armament of Hizballah in this area. There's likewise no mention of the legality or illegality of storing rockets in folks' basements and garages. The Washington Post doesn't do "illegal according to international law".
Finally, note that Israel received a solemn and official promise from the International Community as expressed by its highest authority, the UNSC, in August 2006, and the promise was promptly broken and almost immediately forgotten. Keep this all in mind next time you hear some fool or prime minister or president or whomever chattering on about the risks Israel absolutely MUST take for the sake of peace.
The Power and Denial of Biblical Stories
At one point this afternoon we were standing on the top of the hill where Sokoh once stood. Sokoh was a village in the bronze and iron ages, meaning before the arrival of the tribes of Israel, and then into the period of the First Temple. It's main claim to fame is that according to chapter 17 of the First Book of Samuel, in the section of the valley of Ela between Sokoh and Azeka there was once the most famous duel in history, between young David and very large Goliath.
No, not that Valley of Ela. The real one. The thing is, while Sokoh has been identified with certainty, Azekah hasn't; part of the story we heard today was about new archeological findings, some of them very significant, which may indicate that Azekah was on a hill about a mile to the east of where it was thought to have been until recently. So we peered at the various hills, speculated about lines of vision and ancient borders, heard about new evidence which probably bolsters the Biblical tale of King David's reign, and then clambered down to the bus in the parking lot at the bottom of the hill.
A few minutes later I noticed a fellow reading the sports section of today's paper. The title of the story, splashed over half the width of the page, was "The Battle Between David and Goliath!!!".
This immediacy of the Biblical stories, their automatic presence at the heart of Western culture, ensures that the Palestinian efforts to criminalize Israeli archeology won't succeed. Or could they? As Alex Joffe asks in Jewish Ideas Daily,
No, not that Valley of Ela. The real one. The thing is, while Sokoh has been identified with certainty, Azekah hasn't; part of the story we heard today was about new archeological findings, some of them very significant, which may indicate that Azekah was on a hill about a mile to the east of where it was thought to have been until recently. So we peered at the various hills, speculated about lines of vision and ancient borders, heard about new evidence which probably bolsters the Biblical tale of King David's reign, and then clambered down to the bus in the parking lot at the bottom of the hill.
A few minutes later I noticed a fellow reading the sports section of today's paper. The title of the story, splashed over half the width of the page, was "The Battle Between David and Goliath!!!".
This immediacy of the Biblical stories, their automatic presence at the heart of Western culture, ensures that the Palestinian efforts to criminalize Israeli archeology won't succeed. Or could they? As Alex Joffe asks in Jewish Ideas Daily,
How long will it be before Israeli archeologists are unable to get off a plane in London lest they be served with a subpoena initiated by a Palestinian NGO?
Monday, March 21, 2011
Newsflash: Life is Messy
Just like everyone, I don't pretend to know what's the story with Libya. First the relevant nations spent a month dillying and dallying, then they suddenly passed the international decisions, and the next thing we knew they were bombing Libyan tanks and camps, well beyond a no-fly zone which they'd just spent weeks explaining they couldn't implement because it would be too complicated. Along the way they seem to have thrown out 15 years of chatter about war, intervention, exit strategies and much else.
I have every expectation that whoever comes out on top - whenever - will be an enemy of Israel. Even so, however, I haven't been hiding my position that someone ought to do something to stop Gaddafi from massacring his people. Libya in 2011 is an unusual case of black and white: the dictator has had almost half a century to demonstrate his evil, and the people facing him want liberation from him; it seemed to me (and still does) that it needn't require a bloody land-campaign gamble to protect the Libyan populace in the areas that have already liberated themselves.
Interestingly, everyone with access to a keyboard has an opinion,and many of them are topsy-turvy with frustration. Years from now, when someone with perspective and access to archival documentation tries to piece together what really happened, they'll also need to figure out who was decrying what and why. In the meantime, however, there are a number of immediate responses of interest. Take Phil Wiess, the Jewish antisemite of Mondoweiss: he admits he's confused like we all are, but he's in favor of the attempt. Of course, he intends to use the precedent to call for the UN to bomb Israel next time around, and doesn't even hide his excitement, but at least he's willing to save some Libyans on the road to deliver the Palestinians.
Not far from him on some issues, Andrew Sullivan is furious, furious furious. And also unhappy, and angry. In all his endless verbiage on the topic, he has this revealing nugget:
Silliest of all in this little roundup, we've got Juan Cole, issuing marching orders. He really is a gag.
I have every expectation that whoever comes out on top - whenever - will be an enemy of Israel. Even so, however, I haven't been hiding my position that someone ought to do something to stop Gaddafi from massacring his people. Libya in 2011 is an unusual case of black and white: the dictator has had almost half a century to demonstrate his evil, and the people facing him want liberation from him; it seemed to me (and still does) that it needn't require a bloody land-campaign gamble to protect the Libyan populace in the areas that have already liberated themselves.
Interestingly, everyone with access to a keyboard has an opinion,and many of them are topsy-turvy with frustration. Years from now, when someone with perspective and access to archival documentation tries to piece together what really happened, they'll also need to figure out who was decrying what and why. In the meantime, however, there are a number of immediate responses of interest. Take Phil Wiess, the Jewish antisemite of Mondoweiss: he admits he's confused like we all are, but he's in favor of the attempt. Of course, he intends to use the precedent to call for the UN to bomb Israel next time around, and doesn't even hide his excitement, but at least he's willing to save some Libyans on the road to deliver the Palestinians.
Not far from him on some issues, Andrew Sullivan is furious, furious furious. And also unhappy, and angry. In all his endless verbiage on the topic, he has this revealing nugget:
I watched the president stand idly by as countless young Iranians were slaughtered, imprisoned, tortured and bludgeoned by government thugs by day and night. I believed that this was born of a strategy that understood that, however horrifying it was to watch the Iranian bloodbath, it was too imprudent to launch military action to protect a defenseless people against snipers, murderers and torturers.Morality, you see, is foremost about prudence. This, then, is the answer to Phil Weiss: the UN won't bomb Israel, not because it will accept it's right to defend itself, but simply because Israel would bomb back. (Which brings me back to my position that the only real defense in this world is to be armed, trained, and dangerous).
Silliest of all in this little roundup, we've got Juan Cole, issuing marching orders. He really is a gag.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Politics and International Law
Robin Shepherd last week wrote a delightful article at the Jewish Chronicle about how Obama has weakened the notion that Israeli settlements are illegal. His thesis is that if the UN Security Council is an important legislator of International law, and it just refrained from declaring the settlements to be illegal, apparently they aren't, or at least the case is murky.
Of course, anyone committed to the idea that the settlements are illegal will brush this aside by saying that the American veto which forged that outcome was pure politics, not legality, but that's precisely the point. If you operate in purely legal mode, you've got to accept the manner in which decisions are made and the tools defined for making them. If the decisions aren't to your liking or the tools malfunction according to your lights, you can go back to the sovereign (the electorate) and try to change things until you get to the result you'd like, and you may or may not succeed. Until then, however, you can't say the law is illegal, or the legal situation is illegal, or what have you. In the realm of international law there is no sovereign, which is an enormous problem, but there are rules and the position of the Security Council is pretty strong; there's no legal methodology to say that when the UNSC makes "wrong" decisions, they don't apply. Can't do that.
Of course, some of us find the entire discussion proves its own futility. International conflicts can only be resolved through politics (or war, a continuation of politics). There will be cases where the parties to the conflict agree, for political reasons, to arbitration by legal entities of rules. That's fine for them. (Israel and Egypt disagreeing over Taba, in the early 1980s, is a local example). There will be cases when they won't agree that way, but some other way - say, by ethnically cleansing respective regions until they can bridge the remaining gaps by negotiation, as in the former Yugoslavia. Or they may resolve the matter by one side winning and the other side losing, as between Tibet and China, for example. (In the Sakhalin Islands, the side that won didn't even do anything, except take advantage of the loss of the other side). Sooner or later conflicts end, when the parties decide they're over; international law and institutions can be useful tools, or not, but they aren't the reason the conflicts end.
Normblog, who probably has a higher opinion than mine of the role of international law, notes that the crimes of Gaddafi are rapidly re-awakening the humanitarian interventionist instincts which supposedly died out forever after the invasion of Iraq, a mere 8 years ago. Words like "forever" and "never" rarely mean what they're supposed to mean.
Finally, since I'm on the topic, Human Rights Watch yesterday published two admonishments to Israel and Hamas. Hamas, they pontificated, must stop firing rockets at Israeli civilians, because it's a crime. In a show of perfect balance, they also pontificated that Israel must investigate why when it responds to Hamas fire, civilians sometimes get hit. Now of course, no-one on either side decides what its interests are according to the lights of HRW, nor should they. Governments should be accountable to their electorates (this many not be the case in Gaza, it's hard to know), not to unelected and unaccountable individuals in New York. Yet the imbalance not mentioned in HRW's fake act of impartiality is that when Hamas tries to kill Israeli civilians this is a fundamental element of what Hamas is all about; when IDF actions cause civilian causalities among Palestinians, the Israelis investigate. They don't always investigate with alacrity, and often the results of the investigations indicate greater caring for Israelis and the troops that defend them than for the civilians of the enemy, and sometimes they need to be prodded, but that's the thing about legal systems: they are flexible enough to take account of political considerations, and the sovereign has to ensure they don't stray too far.
Just like international law can't. There's no sovereign, but also no such thing as fully objective impartial truth to be applied in advance to any situation.
Oh, and by the way, the HRW declaration about the bad things Israel does includes that ridiculous canard about how the 300-meter security zone Israel is enforcing along the border of Gaza covers one third of the arable land in Gaza. Some anti-Jewish libels never die, and they don't fade away, either.
Update: in January 2011 the United Nations Human Rights Council announced it was about to adopt a resolution praising Libya for its human rights record. I spoof you not.
Of course, anyone committed to the idea that the settlements are illegal will brush this aside by saying that the American veto which forged that outcome was pure politics, not legality, but that's precisely the point. If you operate in purely legal mode, you've got to accept the manner in which decisions are made and the tools defined for making them. If the decisions aren't to your liking or the tools malfunction according to your lights, you can go back to the sovereign (the electorate) and try to change things until you get to the result you'd like, and you may or may not succeed. Until then, however, you can't say the law is illegal, or the legal situation is illegal, or what have you. In the realm of international law there is no sovereign, which is an enormous problem, but there are rules and the position of the Security Council is pretty strong; there's no legal methodology to say that when the UNSC makes "wrong" decisions, they don't apply. Can't do that.
Of course, some of us find the entire discussion proves its own futility. International conflicts can only be resolved through politics (or war, a continuation of politics). There will be cases where the parties to the conflict agree, for political reasons, to arbitration by legal entities of rules. That's fine for them. (Israel and Egypt disagreeing over Taba, in the early 1980s, is a local example). There will be cases when they won't agree that way, but some other way - say, by ethnically cleansing respective regions until they can bridge the remaining gaps by negotiation, as in the former Yugoslavia. Or they may resolve the matter by one side winning and the other side losing, as between Tibet and China, for example. (In the Sakhalin Islands, the side that won didn't even do anything, except take advantage of the loss of the other side). Sooner or later conflicts end, when the parties decide they're over; international law and institutions can be useful tools, or not, but they aren't the reason the conflicts end.
Normblog, who probably has a higher opinion than mine of the role of international law, notes that the crimes of Gaddafi are rapidly re-awakening the humanitarian interventionist instincts which supposedly died out forever after the invasion of Iraq, a mere 8 years ago. Words like "forever" and "never" rarely mean what they're supposed to mean.
Finally, since I'm on the topic, Human Rights Watch yesterday published two admonishments to Israel and Hamas. Hamas, they pontificated, must stop firing rockets at Israeli civilians, because it's a crime. In a show of perfect balance, they also pontificated that Israel must investigate why when it responds to Hamas fire, civilians sometimes get hit. Now of course, no-one on either side decides what its interests are according to the lights of HRW, nor should they. Governments should be accountable to their electorates (this many not be the case in Gaza, it's hard to know), not to unelected and unaccountable individuals in New York. Yet the imbalance not mentioned in HRW's fake act of impartiality is that when Hamas tries to kill Israeli civilians this is a fundamental element of what Hamas is all about; when IDF actions cause civilian causalities among Palestinians, the Israelis investigate. They don't always investigate with alacrity, and often the results of the investigations indicate greater caring for Israelis and the troops that defend them than for the civilians of the enemy, and sometimes they need to be prodded, but that's the thing about legal systems: they are flexible enough to take account of political considerations, and the sovereign has to ensure they don't stray too far.
Just like international law can't. There's no sovereign, but also no such thing as fully objective impartial truth to be applied in advance to any situation.
Oh, and by the way, the HRW declaration about the bad things Israel does includes that ridiculous canard about how the 300-meter security zone Israel is enforcing along the border of Gaza covers one third of the arable land in Gaza. Some anti-Jewish libels never die, and they don't fade away, either.
Update: in January 2011 the United Nations Human Rights Council announced it was about to adopt a resolution praising Libya for its human rights record. I spoof you not.
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Ernest Sternberg: Purifying the World
Today has been an offline day for me. However, I did find time to have a peek at a link suggested by Y.Ben David, who mentioned an article by Ernest Sternberg titled "Purifying the World: What the New Radical Ideology Stands For". I haven't yet had time to read it carefully, but at first glance Sternberg may have succeeded in tying together the many disparate strands of general nastiness that emanate these days from various parts of what we rather incorrectly call the "far Left". Whether they're Left or not, what they've got in common is a yearning for a pure, post-history world. Predictably, the two main enemies are the United States and Israel (previously known as the Big Satan and the Little Satan, if you remember your Iranian mythology).
There's a short online Sternberg lecture on the topic here.
Interestingly, Sternberg is a professor of geography, or urban planning, or something like that. You may remember that I wrote about his German predecessors of a century ago, just a few days ago. Apparently, some academic disciplines eventually redeem themselves totally.
There's a short online Sternberg lecture on the topic here.
Interestingly, Sternberg is a professor of geography, or urban planning, or something like that. You may remember that I wrote about his German predecessors of a century ago, just a few days ago. Apparently, some academic disciplines eventually redeem themselves totally.
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
How not to Stop Genocide
A few years back Samantha Power wrote an excellent book titled A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. A quick summary of the book would go like this. After WW2 Rephael Lemkin managed to convince the brand new United Nations to define Genocide, and to commit to take action against it. Ironically, the result was not an international willingness to stop genocide, but rather the opposite: a firm international determination never to recognize an event as genocide, not matter how horrible, since such recognition would require intervention, and no-one wants to intervene when faraway folks are being massacred (unless of course there's an obvious and immediate set of interests that do recommend intervention, but in that case the intervention is because of the interests, not the slaughter). Having set up the framework, Power then preceded to show how whichever American administration happened to be in power at the time of a genocide did everything in its power, including bending over backwards, not to recognize it as a genocide, so as not to have to intervene.
And the Americans, as a general rule, were better than anyone else, because they sometimes sort of did eventually do something, as in the Balkans in 1999 after years of European inaction. No-one ever intervened in the Congo, of course, which has had the worst slaughter anywhere in the world since the 1940s. No one had enough interests to care.
David Rieff has a thoughtful (if rather sardonic) article about a new American attempt to think through the issue of genocide prevention. He focuses on the United States Institute for Peace’s task force on genocide, chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen - two people, incidentally, who have track records of failing to deal with genocide in real time, in the days when they were powerful. Although a bit long, the article is worth the time it takes to read. The central insight I came away with is that there's a lot of chatter about multinational efforts, international law, and other fine words, but that the dynamic Samantha Power described is still with us and not about to change anytime soon. (I expect Rieff and Power may not be in the same political camp in American politics, but they're saying similar things).
Jackson Diehl, over at the Washington Post, asks why the Obama administration isn't doing much and certainly isn't being effective as governing Libyans kill civilians in the hundreds. Whats happening in Libya (at least so far) is not genocide, but it is mass murder. Diehl seems to understand the cynical aspects of intervention, which is why he asks what are the American interests that are informing the administration's policy, if any.
Seen from the perspective of a Jew, born after the Holocaust, and an Israeli, this all need not be a moral issue. Foreign countries generally don't intervene when large-scale violence happens, and only rarely do they do anything effective. This isn't because of an innate hatred of Libyans, Bosnians, Congolese, Cambodians and so on. It's because all those folks and many others are, well, ultimately not worth the effort. That's the way of the world. Only those who can take care of themselves will be taken care of.
Which is one reason among many why the endless international chatter and preaching about how Israel (or anyone else) must do this that or the other because the chatterers say so, must be resolutely shut out, not listened to, and never ever taken seriously.
And the Americans, as a general rule, were better than anyone else, because they sometimes sort of did eventually do something, as in the Balkans in 1999 after years of European inaction. No-one ever intervened in the Congo, of course, which has had the worst slaughter anywhere in the world since the 1940s. No one had enough interests to care.
David Rieff has a thoughtful (if rather sardonic) article about a new American attempt to think through the issue of genocide prevention. He focuses on the United States Institute for Peace’s task force on genocide, chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen - two people, incidentally, who have track records of failing to deal with genocide in real time, in the days when they were powerful. Although a bit long, the article is worth the time it takes to read. The central insight I came away with is that there's a lot of chatter about multinational efforts, international law, and other fine words, but that the dynamic Samantha Power described is still with us and not about to change anytime soon. (I expect Rieff and Power may not be in the same political camp in American politics, but they're saying similar things).
Jackson Diehl, over at the Washington Post, asks why the Obama administration isn't doing much and certainly isn't being effective as governing Libyans kill civilians in the hundreds. Whats happening in Libya (at least so far) is not genocide, but it is mass murder. Diehl seems to understand the cynical aspects of intervention, which is why he asks what are the American interests that are informing the administration's policy, if any.
Seen from the perspective of a Jew, born after the Holocaust, and an Israeli, this all need not be a moral issue. Foreign countries generally don't intervene when large-scale violence happens, and only rarely do they do anything effective. This isn't because of an innate hatred of Libyans, Bosnians, Congolese, Cambodians and so on. It's because all those folks and many others are, well, ultimately not worth the effort. That's the way of the world. Only those who can take care of themselves will be taken care of.
Which is one reason among many why the endless international chatter and preaching about how Israel (or anyone else) must do this that or the other because the chatterers say so, must be resolutely shut out, not listened to, and never ever taken seriously.
Friday, February 11, 2011
I'm Speechless
From the New York Times:
The administration appeared as taken aback by Mr. Mubarak’s speech as the crowds in Tahrir Square. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta, testified before the House of Representatives on Thursday morning that there was a “strong likelihood” that Mr. Mubarak would step down by the end of the day.But also:
American officials said Mr. Panetta was basing his statement not on secret intelligence but on media broadcasts, which began circulating before he sat down before the House Intelligence Committee. But a senior administration official said Mr. Obama had also expected that Egypt was on the cusp of dramatic change. Speaking at Northern Michigan University in Marquette, he said, “We are witnessing history unfold,” adding, “America will do everything we can to support an orderly and genuine transition to democracy.”
“The administration has to put everything on the line now,” said Thomas Malinowski, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch, who has been among several outside experts advising the White House on Egypt in recent days. “Whatever cards they have, this is the time to play them.”
Monday, January 31, 2011
Amnesty International: Israel is Criminal by Definition
I've been wondering for months if Amnesty International would ever repent for the way it blasted Israel when our police arrested Ameer Makhuol last year. (Here, here, here and here). I even e-mailed them a couple of times, and tweeted. There was of course never any response, nor was one ever expected.
Yesterday, following Makhoul's conviction, Amnesty International finally revisited the story:
Since the court's decision is in Hebrew, there's no reason to expect anyone at AI will ever read it.
Many years ago, when I was a wee lad at university, I was profoundly and lastingly impressed by the writings of Carl Popper. One of the things I learned from him was about how rational inquiry always needs to ask itself not only what might constitute proof, but what would constitute disproof. In other words, what set of facts might force the inquirer to admit that his thesis is wrong, or at least needs to be modified. If the AI folks and I were still sophomoric students bandying around ideas for the intellectual stimulation, I'd ask them what set of hypothetical facts could possible dampen their conviction that Israel is evil, and is the kind of place that sends innocent men to long jail terms out of mere spite.
Since we're not, I'll postulate that they're driven, among other motivations, by simple old hatred of the Jews, and invite them to submit facts that would disprove this. In any case, they're clearly not in the business of carefully reporting reality. And they are in the business of discrediting the noble idea of human rights.
Yesterday, following Makhoul's conviction, Amnesty International finally revisited the story:
"Ameer Makhoul's jailing is a very disturbing development and we will be studying the details of the sentencing as soon as we can," said Philip Luther, Amnesty International's Middle East and North Africa deputy director.Translated into English: we haven't read the court's decision, but we know it's wrong, and we know it was handed down because Makhoul is a human rights activist who stands up for Palestinians.
"Ameer Makhoul is well known for his human rights activism on behalf of Palestinians in Israel and those living under Israeli occupation. We fear that this may be the underlying reason for his imprisonment."
Since the court's decision is in Hebrew, there's no reason to expect anyone at AI will ever read it.
Many years ago, when I was a wee lad at university, I was profoundly and lastingly impressed by the writings of Carl Popper. One of the things I learned from him was about how rational inquiry always needs to ask itself not only what might constitute proof, but what would constitute disproof. In other words, what set of facts might force the inquirer to admit that his thesis is wrong, or at least needs to be modified. If the AI folks and I were still sophomoric students bandying around ideas for the intellectual stimulation, I'd ask them what set of hypothetical facts could possible dampen their conviction that Israel is evil, and is the kind of place that sends innocent men to long jail terms out of mere spite.
Since we're not, I'll postulate that they're driven, among other motivations, by simple old hatred of the Jews, and invite them to submit facts that would disprove this. In any case, they're clearly not in the business of carefully reporting reality. And they are in the business of discrediting the noble idea of human rights.
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Ameer Makhoul: Human Rights Activist and Hisballah Spy
In May 2010 Amnesty International blasted Israel for arresting one of their own, a human rights activist; they trumpeted the action as cruel Israeli harassment of a honorable man. This morning he was sentenced to nine years in jail for spying for Hisballah.
Either Amnesty retracts its statements, or we'll be left with the conviction the organization supports Hisballah in its war against Israeli citizens.
Either Amnesty retracts its statements, or we'll be left with the conviction the organization supports Hisballah in its war against Israeli citizens.
Sunday, January 9, 2011
The Utopia of Human Rights
Those of us who are old enough may perhaps have a fleeting moment of belated recognition upon reading that
Not that there's anything bad about human rights, of course. Yet as John Grey reminds us, until very recently they were something one required of the state - or, put otherwise, it was recognized they're impossible without a strong state to inform them, and thus if not subordinate, at any rate they didn't outrank the state. He does so while reviewing Samuel Moyn's The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History
, which sounds like a book lots of people ought to be reading. (My list will keep me busy for 5.5 years without sleeping any nights, and that's just the top priority books). The thesis of the book is that in its present form, human rights has become a utopia: un-attainable, even theoretically, thus mildly harmful in the real world. Near the end of the review Grey takes the thesis further than Moyn does:
(h/t, I think, Silke)
Almost never used in English before the 1940s, “human rights” were mentioned in the New York Times five times as often in 1977 as in any prior year of the newspaper’s history. By the nineties, human rights had become central to the thinking not only of liberals but also of neoconservatives, who urged military intervention and regime change in the faith that these freedoms would blossom once tyranny was toppled. From being almost peripheral, the human-rights agenda found itself at the heart of politics and international relations.You know what? He's right, the author. Human rights (the Germans call them Menschenrechte) weren't always the sum of all political thought, nor the only possible pinnacle of human endeavors. If they are now, it's a very new phenomenon.
In fact, it has become entrenched in extremis: nowadays, anyone who is skeptical about human rights is angrily challenged to explain how they can condemn Nazism—as if the only options that exist in political thought are rights-based liberal universalism or out-and-out moral relativism. The fact that those who led the fight against Nazism understood the conflict in quite different terms, with Winston Churchill seeing it simply but not inaccurately as a life-and-death struggle between civilization and barbarism, is not considered relevant.
Not that there's anything bad about human rights, of course. Yet as John Grey reminds us, until very recently they were something one required of the state - or, put otherwise, it was recognized they're impossible without a strong state to inform them, and thus if not subordinate, at any rate they didn't outrank the state. He does so while reviewing Samuel Moyn's The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History
, which sounds like a book lots of people ought to be reading. (My list will keep me busy for 5.5 years without sleeping any nights, and that's just the top priority books). The thesis of the book is that in its present form, human rights has become a utopia: un-attainable, even theoretically, thus mildly harmful in the real world. Near the end of the review Grey takes the thesis further than Moyn does:The intrinsically utopian nature of the human-rights project lies in what its advocates most prize about their movement—its antipolitical orientation. Basic human freedoms do not form a harmonious system whose dictates can be decided by a court, as Rawls and the human-rights movement imagine; they are often at odds with one another—freedom of information with the freedom that goes with privacy, for example. The role of politics is to devise a modus vivendi among these rival liberties. At the back of the rights movement is a vision of an ideal constitution that could in principle be installed everywhere. But such a framework is impossible even in theory, for there are ethical and political conflicts that admit no single, right solution. If neo-Nazism could be countered in the countries where it is reemerging by curbs on free expression and political association, would it be wrong to impose such limits? The answer depends not on any imaginary “rights” but on the effectiveness of the restrictions. Where they have a decent chance of working, I for one would happily support them.Or the right to life on one side of a border vs. the right to life on the other side of it, I might add; but maybe that's just me.
(h/t, I think, Silke)
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Cyber-harvest
Stuff I found here and there:
The British are moving towards ridding themselves of the idiotic law which means Israeli politicians can't travel to London. Apparently the Brits don't enjoy being out of the loop.
Someone in the Jerusalem municipality approved another stage in the process of building hundreds of apartments in East Jerusalem. In this case, Pisgat Zeev. Even according to the Geneva Initiative maps, they'll be built inside the Israeli line. So naturally, the usual suspects are all agog.
The Education Ministry would like to encourage young Arab Israelis to spend a year or two doing civil service in their communities at the age their Jewish counterparts are in the military. So they offered a higher salary to those of them who then turn to teaching. There's a public uproar, and the ministry may have to retract its decision: the Arab leadership sees this as a conspiracy against Israel's Arabs. I spoof you not.
The Turks are convinced the Wikileaks leak is an Israeli conspiracy. How else to explain that Israel isn't hurting, while the Turks are? (Hint: Israeli politicians tell American diplomats the same things they say in public).
Anne Herzberg tells how the ICC isn't good for Israel. At the bottom of her article you'll find a link to a valuable report on Lawfare. 80 pages, alas, but apparently important.
Norman has dug up an article from 1976 about the antisemitism of the Left. As the Good Book says, there's nothing new under the sun. Henryk Broder wrote a fine book about this in the mid-1980s, Der ewige Antisemit
, which means The Eternal Antisemite. Alas, it doesn't seem to be in English, but if you're not Germanically-challenged, I recommend. The phenomenon did not start because of those apartments in Pisgat Zeev.
The British are moving towards ridding themselves of the idiotic law which means Israeli politicians can't travel to London. Apparently the Brits don't enjoy being out of the loop.
Someone in the Jerusalem municipality approved another stage in the process of building hundreds of apartments in East Jerusalem. In this case, Pisgat Zeev. Even according to the Geneva Initiative maps, they'll be built inside the Israeli line. So naturally, the usual suspects are all agog.
The Education Ministry would like to encourage young Arab Israelis to spend a year or two doing civil service in their communities at the age their Jewish counterparts are in the military. So they offered a higher salary to those of them who then turn to teaching. There's a public uproar, and the ministry may have to retract its decision: the Arab leadership sees this as a conspiracy against Israel's Arabs. I spoof you not.
The Turks are convinced the Wikileaks leak is an Israeli conspiracy. How else to explain that Israel isn't hurting, while the Turks are? (Hint: Israeli politicians tell American diplomats the same things they say in public).
Anne Herzberg tells how the ICC isn't good for Israel. At the bottom of her article you'll find a link to a valuable report on Lawfare. 80 pages, alas, but apparently important.
Norman has dug up an article from 1976 about the antisemitism of the Left. As the Good Book says, there's nothing new under the sun. Henryk Broder wrote a fine book about this in the mid-1980s, Der ewige Antisemit
, which means The Eternal Antisemite. Alas, it doesn't seem to be in English, but if you're not Germanically-challenged, I recommend. The phenomenon did not start because of those apartments in Pisgat Zeev.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Terrorism: Glenn Greenwald vs. Michael Walzer
The comments on my post yesterday about Glenn Greenwald were interesting, and seemed to indicate a bit of confusion between different matters. So here's a quick lexicon of relevant terms:
Manslaughter: the unintended killing of a person. In all systems of law I've ever heard of, manslaughter is less serious than murder, even though the consequence for the victim is the same: death.
Murder. The intentional taking of an innocent life. It's the intention that makes the difference, not the result. In Right to Exist: A Moral Defense of Israel's Wars
I pointed out that the Sixth of the Ten Commandments is not "thou shall not kill", as often mistranslated, but rather "thou shall not murder". Judaism recognizes that killing sometimes happens, such as in self defense or in war.
Self defense. Protecting oneself may sometimes include killing. When evaluating the act, it's not the result - the death of a person - which is important, it's the intention. Of the attacker. The court or the police may decide that killing the aggressor was justified by the intention of the (dead) aggressor.
War. This is the most common way for people to kill large numbers of other people. The mere fact of being at war tells very little about morality, since some wars avert worse things, such as genocide, others promote genocide, and many wars happen for complicated reasons which do not immediately lend themselves to moral deliberation. I have written about this at greater length here.
Terrorism. Initially, this wasn't a moral category at all. It was a tactic of random murder, intended to terrorize a society into changing its behavior in a significant manner, contrary to its will, perpetrated by an otherwise small or weak group. The phenomenon first appeared in the 19th century. Then a double twist occurred.
The first was in the 1980s. At the time the most famous terrorist group was the PLO (alongside the IRA). Lots of people were reluctant to use such a pejorative word to describe Arabs killing Jews: The Arabs had oil, they were supported by the Soviets and thus also by Western Useful Idiots, the Jews were, well, Jews. So the term was dropped, replaced by the term 'militants'. So cynical was this ploy that for years the international news of the BBC called the PLO militants, while the local news of the same BBC called the IRA terrorists. (I'm not making this up). The English language lost the word to describe the people who had once been militants, but this seemed a worthy price to pay for political correctness.
Then, after 9/11, suddenly there was an urgent need for a clearly pejorative word to describe the perpetrators of random murder committed by a small group with the intention of terrorizing an entire society. At the time I remember watching the agonizing, but it didn't take long for the American media to go back to the obvious word, 'terrorist'. Once the terrorists began exploding bombs on European trains, the word was accepted worldwide. (Interestingly, this was happening parallel to a steep decrease in Palestinian terrorism, forced by the IDF and the security barrier, so the dilemma of using the word for everyone except the Jews was blunted).
Yet there was a problem: lots of people didn't like the ensuing wars, nor the regrettable fact that Western troops were now killing Muslim civilians. So they started applying the terrorist word to them, too. There was no need, of course, since armies killing civilians as a result of the messiness of war were never previously called terrorists. Armies aren't small groups; the Western ones were not randomly killing innocents so as to terrorize them. It would have been better to use a different term, one that would do what language is supposed to do, namely describe reality with useful preciseness. But preciseness was the last thing the wielders of the term were seeking; their goal was to bludgeon the political discourse in their ideological direction.
And so we've come full circle and kept on going. Not only is the word terrorism back in vogue, it's now applied with a gusto to anyone who kills non-combatants, unless they're Islamists killing Muslims, in which case they're called insurgents. (And the Palestinians are still militants).
Glenn Greenwald's argument demonstrates how radical this is. Back in 1976, when Michael Walzer published his seminal Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations
, a book still widely cited, he included a discussion of intentionally killing non-combatants in a non-belligerent country. The Allies had reason to believe the Germans were developing nuclear weapons, and at one point had to decide to sink a Norwegian ship which might have been transporting heavy water but was certainly carrying regular Norwegian civilians; the Norwegians, remember, were notionally on the Allies' side. Yet the danger of a Nazi nuclear bomb was so great it was decided to sacrifice random innocent Norwegians to prevent it. The fact that by the time Walzer wrote his book it was long since clear that there had in fact been no Nazi nuclear program to be thwarted was irrelevant, since the decision makers couldn't have known that and had reasonable reason to believe the opposite. After he works through the matter as philosophers do, Walzer justifies the decision.
Greenwald, facing a lesser case where someone killed an Iranian nuclear scientist without scratching any innocents at all, calls it terrorism.
Manslaughter: the unintended killing of a person. In all systems of law I've ever heard of, manslaughter is less serious than murder, even though the consequence for the victim is the same: death.
Murder. The intentional taking of an innocent life. It's the intention that makes the difference, not the result. In Right to Exist: A Moral Defense of Israel's Wars
I pointed out that the Sixth of the Ten Commandments is not "thou shall not kill", as often mistranslated, but rather "thou shall not murder". Judaism recognizes that killing sometimes happens, such as in self defense or in war.Self defense. Protecting oneself may sometimes include killing. When evaluating the act, it's not the result - the death of a person - which is important, it's the intention. Of the attacker. The court or the police may decide that killing the aggressor was justified by the intention of the (dead) aggressor.
War. This is the most common way for people to kill large numbers of other people. The mere fact of being at war tells very little about morality, since some wars avert worse things, such as genocide, others promote genocide, and many wars happen for complicated reasons which do not immediately lend themselves to moral deliberation. I have written about this at greater length here.
Terrorism. Initially, this wasn't a moral category at all. It was a tactic of random murder, intended to terrorize a society into changing its behavior in a significant manner, contrary to its will, perpetrated by an otherwise small or weak group. The phenomenon first appeared in the 19th century. Then a double twist occurred.
The first was in the 1980s. At the time the most famous terrorist group was the PLO (alongside the IRA). Lots of people were reluctant to use such a pejorative word to describe Arabs killing Jews: The Arabs had oil, they were supported by the Soviets and thus also by Western Useful Idiots, the Jews were, well, Jews. So the term was dropped, replaced by the term 'militants'. So cynical was this ploy that for years the international news of the BBC called the PLO militants, while the local news of the same BBC called the IRA terrorists. (I'm not making this up). The English language lost the word to describe the people who had once been militants, but this seemed a worthy price to pay for political correctness.
Then, after 9/11, suddenly there was an urgent need for a clearly pejorative word to describe the perpetrators of random murder committed by a small group with the intention of terrorizing an entire society. At the time I remember watching the agonizing, but it didn't take long for the American media to go back to the obvious word, 'terrorist'. Once the terrorists began exploding bombs on European trains, the word was accepted worldwide. (Interestingly, this was happening parallel to a steep decrease in Palestinian terrorism, forced by the IDF and the security barrier, so the dilemma of using the word for everyone except the Jews was blunted).
Yet there was a problem: lots of people didn't like the ensuing wars, nor the regrettable fact that Western troops were now killing Muslim civilians. So they started applying the terrorist word to them, too. There was no need, of course, since armies killing civilians as a result of the messiness of war were never previously called terrorists. Armies aren't small groups; the Western ones were not randomly killing innocents so as to terrorize them. It would have been better to use a different term, one that would do what language is supposed to do, namely describe reality with useful preciseness. But preciseness was the last thing the wielders of the term were seeking; their goal was to bludgeon the political discourse in their ideological direction.
And so we've come full circle and kept on going. Not only is the word terrorism back in vogue, it's now applied with a gusto to anyone who kills non-combatants, unless they're Islamists killing Muslims, in which case they're called insurgents. (And the Palestinians are still militants).
Glenn Greenwald's argument demonstrates how radical this is. Back in 1976, when Michael Walzer published his seminal Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations
, a book still widely cited, he included a discussion of intentionally killing non-combatants in a non-belligerent country. The Allies had reason to believe the Germans were developing nuclear weapons, and at one point had to decide to sink a Norwegian ship which might have been transporting heavy water but was certainly carrying regular Norwegian civilians; the Norwegians, remember, were notionally on the Allies' side. Yet the danger of a Nazi nuclear bomb was so great it was decided to sacrifice random innocent Norwegians to prevent it. The fact that by the time Walzer wrote his book it was long since clear that there had in fact been no Nazi nuclear program to be thwarted was irrelevant, since the decision makers couldn't have known that and had reasonable reason to believe the opposite. After he works through the matter as philosophers do, Walzer justifies the decision.Greenwald, facing a lesser case where someone killed an Iranian nuclear scientist without scratching any innocents at all, calls it terrorism.
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