Friday, April 11, 2008
Murdering People You Know
Misguided observers often plead for programs that will bring together Palestinians and Israelis, in the hope that if people know one another they'll recognize their common humanity and desist from warring.
As if. Shall we parse this story? The two suspects had no work permits, which means they were employed by a Jew in Ramat Gan who was willing to look the other way - undoubtedly because he was paying them less, but in any case, it was an arrangement that everyone understood and accepted. They were going to put this poison into the food they were preparing, and the people who would have been hurt (killed?) would have been of three groups: anonymous patrons of the restaurant; regulars, with whom the suspects might have had a relationship; and fellow colleagues at the restaurant, with whom they most certainly had some sort of human relationship and familiarity.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
My Lai, Kfar Kassem, and How to Train Soldiers
I told Achikam that while I don't know, I assume that most young Americans don't know about My Lai, and many Americans of all ages no longer care. That war is long over, and its events have long since receded, even if they still instruct the political understanding of a segment of America's voters - but not the rest. (My American readers are welcome to contest this statement if they wish: I'm writing from anecdotal knowledge, not well founded knowledge).
Then I asked Achikam how many young Israelis does he think have ever heard of the massacre at Kfar Kassem? Perhaps he, Achikam, is unusual in knowing about it?
Impossible, he said. Anyone who has gone through basic training has heard about the massacre at Kfar Kassem, as part of the training to prevent anything like it ever happening again.
I was a mite surprised by this (not greatly so, but a little bit) and asked him who talked about this in his basic training, and if perhaps that individual might have been unusual.
Nonsense, he said. The topic was raised repeatedly by the lieutenant, not one of the NCOs, in official training contexts that were repeated throughout the training course specifically to sensitize the soldiers to issues of morality at war, and they weren't the idea of that specific officer because he was working from a syllabus that was handed down from the educational branch of the IDF; Achikam's friends in other branches were getting the same materials. "It's inconceivable that a soldier who goes through basic training (which means, all soldiers) would NOT have heard about the time Israeli soldiers massacred Arab civilians in cold blood during the Sinai Campaign (October 1956)".
Those of you who have read Right to Exist may recollect that I told about having this experience when I was in basic training. But that was quite a while ago, and the event we were being warned about had happened around the time of our birth, which means that the older officers and sergeants - not our staff, but the top brass at least - still remembered it. Achikam is telling that he and his comrades are being warned to remember an event that happened before their parents were born.
A Society of Many Colors
Wednesday, April 9, 2008
On Living Until Dying
James Bond and the Arab League
Is this possible? How would I know? I'm not a spook. It certainly wouldn't easily fit into the prevailing meta-narrative about good guys and bad guys in the world in general and the Mideast in particular, so on that level I rather hope it is true even if we now need the Iranians in order to know who's who. Also, the world of spooks is a strange and spooky place. Having said all that, I doubt we'll ever know, but I expect the story probably isn't true, unless of course it is.
Palestinian Fighters Strive for the Welfare of their Brethren
... the gunmen were affiliated with the Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, the Popular Resistance Committees' the Salah al-Din Brigades, and Fatah's Mujahideen fighters of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. The source further said the fight "will go on until the last bullet."Which means, a broad coalition.
Two Israelis have been killed. Their names are not yet public, since their families have not yet been informed. But it should be clear: the border crossing is an installation that exists purely for the benefit of the Palestinians. Israelis don't use it. The merchandise that goes thru it is intended for the Palestinians, and includes the fuel Israel supplies them with (you all remember the international outcry a month or two ago when Israel reduced these supplies, since it's a given truth that Israel owes this service to her sworn enemies in Gaza). Which means that these brave Palestinian fighters could have had only one goal: to obstruct the flow of goods into Gaza. And the Israelis they killed were people whose job it was to assure these supplies to the Palestinians.
This news item also mentions an item from earlier this morning about an Israeli soldier who was killed in a battle with Palestinian fighters last night. He was Druze, which means he's an Arabic-speaking Israeli. So the toll for the day is one Arabic-speaking Israeli soldier killed in battle as an IDF soldier, and two Jewish civilians killed assisting the Palestinian populace.
It's an interesting world, isn't it. Maybe in a few hours I'll try to do a roundup of the usual suspects to see if this gets reported anywhere, and if so, if truthfully.
Tuesday, April 8, 2008
The Stanley Milgram Obedience Experiment
Now, imagine what would have happened had she carefully watched the whole film, or perhaps even read the book. She might have been forced to reject the accepted wisdom altogether. Rightfully so.
Oxymoron
(By the way: some of my best friends are in Peace Now).
Monday, April 7, 2008
McDonalds or Not
Lots of places to choose from.
The single largest establishment if you're measuring square meters is the McDonald's: an entire building of its own, two full floors and a patio. I've never been inside, but the thing is, apparently many people never have. It never looks crowded and often when I walk by it seems empty, irrespective of how crowded all the other places are.
Last week construction crews arrived and started banging walls and digging under the patio, and a couple days later someone put op a big banner announcing yet another cafe soon to open. The McDonald's seems still open, but perhaps they've leased part of the structure; or maybe they're moving out entirely, in stages.
Sunday, April 6, 2008
Calatrava in Jerusalem - Getting Close
On the Futility of Palestinian Violence: Bronner
The question remains, when will the Palestinians understand what will - namely, that they demonstrate that their goal is to build their state next to ours, rather than to destroy ours and then to wallow in their misery.
On the Futility of Palestinian Strategies: Zubeidi
A number of months ago the Israelis and the (West Bank) Palestinians agreed on a list of men who would be taken off Israel's active wanted list if they laid down their arms. Zubeidi is one of them. So while there are millions of Palestinians, and no single one of them is representative of them all, this one needs to be listened to, for his words (and silences) are instructive well beyond his private persona.
My aim was for us, by means of the 'resistance' [code for terror attacks], to get a message out to the world. Back in Abu Amar's day [the nom de guerre of Yasser Arafat], we had a plan, there was a strategy, and we would carry his orders."Need I contextualize? The 2nd Intifada started two months after the Palestinians rejected the Israeli offers made at Camp David in the Summer of 2000, at which according to all versions the Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Barak made some dramatic proposals. One was to disband all settlements in Gaza and many of those in the West Bank. This cut the ground out from under the chief Palestinian grievance during the Oslo Process, whereby the Israelis couldn't possibly intend to relinquish territories if they were still building on them. After Arafat rejected the proposals without making any counter proposals, the negotiations continued in mid-September, and the violence broke out at the end of September. Zubeidi now tells that the decision to turn to violence was calculated and taken clearly, and the direction came straight from Arafat. Nothing particularly new about this, except that it was the opposite of approximately 100% of the media reportage at the time.
In effect, are you saying what Amos Gilad and intelligence always said, that Arafat planned everything?
"Right. Everything that was done in the intifada was done according to Arafat's instructions, but he didn't need to tell us the things explicitly. We understood his message."
The reason Arafat and his thousands of active followers felt they had to do this was "to get a message out to the world". This at a period where the number one time consumer on the schedule of the President of the United States was the Palestinians. After the Israelis retreated to what most of us regarded as too far in the face of Palestinian demands, in January 2001, and we threw out our government for doing so, the Palestinians escalated their violence dramatically, until eventually Israel violently put a stop to it in 2002-2004. As Zubeidi fully acknowledges:
We failed entirely in the intifada. We haven't seen any benefit or positive result from it. We achieved nothing. It's a crushing failure. We failed at the political level - we didn't succeed in translating the military actions into political achievements. The current leadership does not want armed actions, and since the death of Abu Amar, there's no one who is capable of using our actions to bring about such achievements. When Abu Amar died, the armed intifada died with him."Context, again: They systematically waged violence against Israeli civilians, in order to achieve more than the Israelis were willing to offer. Since by then Israel had offered effectively 100% of the West Bank, full partition of Jerusalem, dismantling of most settlements and some sort of land swap for those that would remain, one must ask what additional goals they had in mind?
Finally, what Zubeidi dosn't say - or rather, what he doesn't do. He admits defeat. He acknowledges that Israel cannot be beaten militarily, thus the whole thing was futile. (Bloody, destructive, murderous - but futile). And so what does he do with all this? He Kvetches. He sleeps till noon. He sometimes goes to play at being an actor, or not, depending. He expects an internal war to tear apart the Palestinians, but the most he feels he must do is damn his own politicians.
The thought of taking his very significant destructive power and turning it into something constructive, seems never to cross his mind. He has a long proven track record of leading his men to death in Israeli towns, but he cannot conceive of harnessing his charisma towards building the best they can possibly achieve in the present situation; the thought that if they were to focus on building rather than destroying they might even find eager partners in the Israelis doesn't even exist in his universe.
Truly a depressing interview.
Friday, April 4, 2008
Yaacov Calling Ibrahim
Yaacov
Obstinately not Seeing Reality
I know effectively nothing about Cyprus, for all it's being a mere hop away from here. Nor do I have any dog in that particular conflict, though like any reasonable person I'd prefer the Cypriots to figure out how to live together amicably, if possible. The point of this post is to poke fun at the Guardian on an issue that doesn't touch upon Israel.
The Guardian reports on the event with a 1,210-word gushing report. How wonderful! How exciting! How hopeful! And even better, the reason for all the euphoria is that both sides have Lefty leaders!
Only at the very end of the article is there one minor note of wariness:
But the day ended on a sour note last night when the checkpoint was closed on the Greek side amid claims Turkish Cypriots had violated an agreement.You couldn't make this up. I wish I knew which planet these folks hail from.
Thinking on One's Own
Thursday, April 3, 2008
Cherry Picking in Iraq
Referring to two depictions in the American media of the situation in Iraq in summer 2007, one mildly negative, the other mildly positive:
Readers who believed the first story refused to believe the second. Readers who believed the second refused to believe the first. In a sense, they believed or refused to believe each story before it was published, even before it occurred. There wasn’t a moment’s pause to digest information, much less to weigh facts dispassionately; objectivity wasn’t even an aspiration. What mattered was whether the facts supported the theory or not. Throughout the opinion classes, the impulse to keep a little part of the brain open to inconvenient facts seemed to have been extinguished. In magazine offices, bloggers’ bedrooms, Hollywood studios, and the White House, a fantasy war was underway, a demonstration of American virtue or a series of crimes against humanity—both of them self-serving fictions.
[...]
Two of these films do have merits—In the Valley of Elah features an affecting performance by Tommy Lee Jones, and The Situation, written by Wendell Steavenson, a British writer who spent over a year in occupied Iraq, contains two more or less recognizable Iraqi characters. But the films also present the war as incomprehensible mayhem, and they depict American soldiers as psychopaths who may as well be wearing SS uniforms. The G.I.s rape, burn, and mutilate corpses, torture detainees, accelerate a vehicle to run over a boy playing soccer, wantonly kill civilians and journalists in firefights, humiliate one another, and coolly record their own atrocities for entertainment. Have these things happened in Iraq? Many have. But in the cinematic version of the war, these are the only things that happen in Iraq. At a screening of The Situation, I was asked to discuss the film with its director, Philip Haas. Why had he portrayed the soldiers in cartoon fashion, I wondered. Why had he missed their humor, their fear, their tenderness for one another and even, every now and then, for Iraqis? Because, Haas said, he wanted to concentrate on humanizing his Iraqi characters instead.
Except, of course, that in order to humanize the Iraqis, one would need to know something about them. Learn their language, perhaps. Live among them. Even merely listen to them intently - ah, for that you need language, don't you.
In the name of fairness, by the way, I should add that at least the American media offers two stereotypical versions of the events. Most of the rest of the world only gets one version. By now, this is largely true even for the Israeli media, which started out warily supporting the invasion, but has long since joined the ranks of the scoffers, in spite of being much closer to the events on almost all levels.Anyway, this post should be read as a direct continuation of the previous one.
Wednesday, April 2, 2008
On Being Plausibly Right
Yesterday Mr. ibn Yusuf was defending Hamas, or perhaps, he was claiming that Israel is just as bad. His line of reasoning, so far as I understood it, was roughly thus: The Israelis are as anti-Palestinian as the Hamas is anti-Israeli, and Israeli Jewish children are inculcated with as much hatred as the Palestinian children, except that the Israelis, being more sophisticated, have learned to cloak their nastiness, while Hamas hasn't.
(Devious, aren't they, those Israelis? The honest but unsophisticated Palestinians will never be their match, but perhaps it's better so -- haven't we heard this line of reasoning before? Elsewhere, in other dark days?)
There are so many levels on which to reject this argumentation that's it's hard to choose. However, I'd like to do so on a methodological level, by addressing the question of how we know what we know in history.
I don't mean the question of documentation, which is comparatively straightforward: is there documentation to demonstrate that something happened, or isn't there? This is a juncture where historians have no choice but to diverge from their post modern friends over in the literature departments. No, what I'm addressing is the less precise but often more interesting question about how to understand and interpret the historical facts. Can a society inculcate its children with a Weltsanschauung while hiding it from everyone else, and is this the same as using the full force of the media and everything that goes with it, for example.
I'm a student of Karl Popper in this. My reading of him (many years ago) was that since in history we cannot create laboratory conditions so as to repeat an experiment someone else has said he's just done and thus verify it, we can only strive for second best. And second best, in history (or politics, I'd add) is to formulate your thesis, and then do your utmost to find facts that will disprove it; only when your repeated attempts to disprove your thesis fail, and you can find no facts that might weaken your position, only then can you begin to assume that perhaps you're right - and perhaps not, since there still may be facts out there that will disprove you, only you haven't found them yet.
Cherry picking for facts that will bolster your position is worthless, if not a type of deceit.
Do any of us consistently live up to this standard Popper formulated? Probably not well enough. But some are better at it than others. Another point I seem to remember Popper making was that in free societies with freedom to express yourself, people have no choice but to resort at least partially to his method, since if they don't someone else will for them; in the dictatorships, meanwhile, there is no one to guard the truth.
So, Mr. ibn Yusuf, next time you start collecting incriminating evidence about how bad we are, try pausing for a moment and asking yourself if there might not be even more compelling facts that might say the opposite.
Science, not Fiction
Women readers need not follow the link. I've never yet encountered a woman who thinks science fiction is worth the time, nor even heard of the existence of such a woman. As a matter of fact, even the guys among you might want to be circumspect while following the link, given that what we read is what we're worth.
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
On Uncertainty
Then there are the questions of who makes the decision, and by which criteria. At an earlier stage, many months ago, we learned that expert number one in North America would have had a clearcut opinion about the deliberation we were facing at that time, but that his position would have been the opposite of that of the entire relevant medical establishment in Germany; the person telling us is himself a world renowned expert, and he was telling as an explanation for his own uncertainty.
And that assumes it's the physicians who should be making the decision - a position which itself is hardly obvious.
At the heart of the matter lies our uncertainty. We don't know what will happen tomorrow, or next week, or next year. So we do our best with what we have.
This uncertainty is the foundation of the entire human condition, isn't it. It's what medicine is about, but also politics, and history. It's what economics are about, and all ideologies and Weltanschauungen. If it isn't what literature and poetry are about, I can't think what is. And religion, of course. Cynics will say that religion is what gives unknowing people the tools with which to lull themselves into the ability to make decisions by comforting them that they're correct. Respecters of religion will say that it gives people the dignity to live with their decisions, whatever they might be.
Poisoning Children's Minds
You could say that they are infused with antisemitism, except that antisemitism is a European invention, an attempt to justify hatred of the Jews even in a world that no longer cared about what the Jews did or didn't do to Jesus. This, however, harks back openly to a far older tradition. Erlanger, however, doesn't get into this discussion, he merely reports on the present.
There is nothing new nor surprising in the report, for those of us who care about such matters and follow them. For those who don't care, there isn't any significance to the report, either. Having read the Guardian daily for years by now I can say with confidence that if you look hard enough you actually can find echoes of this in their reportage, but the impact of the reportage is not in the echoes but rather in the main cacophony; the same goes, for example, for the New York Review of Books. Juan Cole would never link to such a report, but his is a private blog, so he can choose as he wishes.
I'm linking to this not because the NYT needs me to promote its content, but rather to record the fact that they published such a report, and perhaps, in the future, to wonder if they read their own newspaper.