The end of the story is that the attempt to divert a Turkish ship from breaking Israel's blockade of Gaza was a fiasco. Israel churned out video and testimony showing that the boarding force thought it was facing a ship full of naive Western Hamas supporters intent on grandstanding, while in reality it was a ship of Turkish and Arab thugs eager to participate in the war against the Jewish State, as if this would somehow win us the case. It won't.
It will of course be important widely to disseminate these videos and reports, so as to bolster the base (in which spirit, I'm linking to Solomonia who seems to have the single best one-post roundup, while Elder of Ziyon has a raft of interesting posts reflecting his trawling of Arab sources. Many others also did fine work). Yet let us not delude ourselves: the operation was a failure. It caused a tidal wave of condemnation of Israel; it may yet lead to harmful diplomatic fallout; and while it achieved the narrow goal of upholding the blockade, it strengthened the resolve of our enemies, and enhanced the distaste many observers feel towards us.
It may have been justified, but it wasn't wise. Most people will ask what Israeli troops were doing on the ship in the first place, thus canceling the impact of all those videos, and they'll ask why there's a blockade on Gaza that anyone needs to break, thus accepting the basic premise of the flotilla's organizers.
We need to step back and remind ourselves of the broad picture of the concentric circles at whose center we live.
The outer circle is the utter hatred large swathes of the Muslim World bear towards the idea and reality of a Jewish state. As a demonstrator in Istanbul shouted, there can be no Jewish state in the Arab world: what bothers him about the siege of Gaza is that Jews are in the position to impose it, not it's particular details. (The irony of Turks hating Jews for infractions of human rights or international law is striking).
The next circle are the Westerners of various stripes who also wish Israel gone, and reject the right of the Jews to be a nation. Many of the hate-motivated Muslims are willing or eager to engage in violence. Most of the Westerns haters aren't. They prefer to spew their malice at places like the Guardian, as documented daily by CiFWatch, or at many similar cesspools. Some, however, go further: Gerta Berlin, for example, a spokesperson of the Free Gaza Movement which collaborated in launching the flotilla, tells proudly that she's been active in Palestinian causes since the early 1960s, when Gaza was occupied by Egypt, not that she cared. She and her ilk are enemies of Israel, and will hi-jack whatever narrative holds out promise of damaging Israel. Today it's Gaza, before that it was Jenin, and next it will be... whatever.
Then there's the very large circle of cynics idealists and the lazy. The cynics are epitomized by, say, China. The Chinese don't care about international law or morality. They care about power and China. When working with Israel fits their purposes they'll do so gladly; when not, not. In neither case will they be motivated by the conditions in Gaza, to which they are utterly indifferent unless there's an angle for Chinese profit.
The idealists are the opposite of the cynics: they truly believe that post-WWII humanity lurched into a new historical era of dwindling nationalism, growing universalism and international institutions, and receding violence. Many take the profound insight of the Enlightenment, that all Men can recognize common truths through rational inquiry, and pretend it means that all men will, or that rational inquiry will lead all men to the same positions.
The lazy are the multitudes who live far from the genuine trouble spots, and pretend they aren't there; indeed, they insist they aren't there, or aren't genuine, lest they be called upon to act. Many of the lazy are so existentially lethargic they can't even be bothered to have children, since the raising of them would be such a hassle.
Of course many people manage to combine cynicism with idealism and laziness, but that's a topic for a book, not a blog post.
Most people in the three groups are not against Israel in any active way, and some even like Israel (in a lazy way). Yet they all find Israel ever more troublesome: the cynics, because Israel's actions interfere with business; the idealists because Israel insists on living in the wrong narrative; and the lazy because - oh, why don't the Israelis resolve their pesky issues and get on with life?
None of this is novel. Being horribly out of sync is what Jews do; the present bout has the magnificent advantage that it's being enacted from a position of strength.
There's a circle of people who deeply support Israel; most of them, oddly, are non-Jews who care about Israel's existence and well-being, or who recognize the forces arraigned against Israel as their own enemies. For them Israel is a focus of intense interest, not an anecdotal story on the edge of their world. In America they may even be the majority – but no-where else. Then there's the inner circle, the one Israelis and their neighbors live in. All the others are constructs, words. This one is real. Actions have palpable consequences; wrong decisions make people die. In this inner circle, Israel accommodating itself to a Palestinian state in the 1990s causes a bloody war in 2000-2004. Moving out of Lebanon in 2000 set the stage for a bloody war in 2006. Ending that war with UNSC resolution 1701, which called for Hezbullah to be disarmed and created international mechanisms to ensure it, enabled Hezbullah to quadruple its arm caches so the next war will be far bloodier. Moving out of Gaza in 2005 caused the rise of Hamas, violence, a nasty war in 2009, and a worse one further on. Real people really die because of these things.
Israel will not disappear, not now, not later. It is one of the most vital places on earth, bursting with creativity and hugely committed to success; this is also one of the better moments in 3000 years of Jewish history – a rather glum statement, that, but true. Yet Israel is not being wise, as the case of the flotilla shows.
We all know that the threat from Hezbollah is greater than from Hamas, yet we don't blockade Lebanon. The price would be too high, so we grimly prepare for the next war in the hope that being prepared well enough will postpone it for a while, and in the meantime it's not an international detriment; on the contrary, perhaps we gain a measure of goodwill that we'll cash in on eventually. So why blockade Gaza? Is the blockade essential? Six months from now, or six years, we'll lift it, and Gaza will still be full of people who fervently wish for our destruction, just like in Lebanon: nu? At that point the defunct blockade will no longer be essential?
Some military actions will always be unavoidable. Do we do our very best to ensure that when we apply force, we're doing so in the most brilliant way possible? Have we thought out every scenario, and formulated a response to every counter move our enemies will make? Couldn't we could have silently jammed the propellers of those ships, leaving them dead in the water and begging us to save them from the blistering heat? Instead of heroic victims they'd be the world's laughing stock. I'm a mere blogger, not a decision maker, so perhaps there were reasons not to go that way: but were all options considered? Was the fiasco we ended up with the sole alternative? We handed our enemies an epic propaganda victory on a silver platter: that can't have been the best option? Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Jazeera, the Guardian and Greta Berlin: these are our sworn enemies and there's nothing we can say that will reconcile us with them. Every action we take against them, however, must be calibrated – to the limited degree possible – to harm them, not enhance their position.
The cynics, the idealists and the lazy are not on our side, but nor are they inevitably our enemies. While we must not harm ourselves to attract their approval, we must vigilantly do our utmost to craft reality so it plays to our benefit, not our detriment. Defiance may be gratifying, but it's not always intelligent.
The decision to use measured force to block the flotilla was reasonable, if one assumes the blockade is essential, and if it could be done with no fanfare. The blockade, however, probably isn't essential, and the fanfare was what the organizers craved. Sadly, we're promoting their interests, not ours. After millennia of powerlessness, the Jews have trained themselves to be among the world's best warriors: this is a source of pride and satisfaction, not something to apologize for. Now we need to learn the art of manipulative politics and refined scheming, of effective propaganda and cynical posturing, all while never losing that military prowess. We need the appearance of being right as often as possible, not only the conviction of it; and we need to achieve this by the standards of the cynics, the idealists and the lazy, not by our standards.
Monday, May 31, 2010
Gaza Flotilla
I've been offline most of the day, and anyway don't feel the need to respond to last night's events off the cuff. Later, perhaps tonight, I'll get to it.
Sunday, May 30, 2010
Against the Haredim Before Being for Them, then Against
Here's a fine example of why Israel is so exasperating, and nigh impossible for outsiders truly to follow. Let's see if we can unravel the tangled strands.
Ron Huldai used to be a general in our air-force. When he finished that, he went to run the Herzliya high-school in Tel Aviv - admittedly a high-profile school but still only a high-school. Most generals aim higher (or lower, when they become arms-dealers in Africa, or BMW's boss in Israel). So that was admirable. A few years later he ran for mayor, and since he keeps on getting re-elected he must be doing something right. I'm often in Tel Aviv these days, and grudgingly admit that it's not a bad-looking town; I'm even beginning to like it, in a wary sort of way. Tel Aviv is a very secular town (though Rishon Leziyon is even more so), and many Israelis from elsewhere will tell you it's a bit detached from the rest of the country. Or not, as this story indicates.
Huldai recently spoke out against the refusal of some Haredi schools to teach what's called the Core Program. This is defined as the utter minimum of modern studies that school children in Israel must have, and includes mostly some Maths and English. If parents wish their children to spend all their time studying religious things (Jewish, Arab, whatever), that's their right, so long as the children get the Core Program. Some Haredi schools object even to that, and Huldai correctly came out against them. His position is relevant because elementary schools get much of their funding through municipalities. (This paragraph has been a simplification, but it will have to do).
So far so good.
In recent years there have been a small but noticeable number of young Haredi families who have moved into Ramat Aviv, an expensive and very secular area in the north of Tel Aviv. I drove through a couple months ago and was startled to see how visible they were - well, they do rather stand out in their uniforms against the backdrop of the Ramat Aviv mall. The locals don't like them there, and especially don't like the local Chabad House - though if they understood Haredi society they'd know that Chabad isn't exactly Haredi, it's Chabad. But when dealing with stereotypes, who's counting. They're apparently especially worried about the influence Chabad is having on local teenagers, though if you ask me it would be better to offer some sort of counter influence if you're all worried about your children being enticed by something. As Cat Stevens once said, it's a wild world out there (and look what happened to him... hmmn. Maybe I shouldn't have brought that up).
Anyway, some of the locals are getting organized to stop the influx of unwanted Haredi into their neighborhood, and it appears they're demanding of their mayor that he back their position:
Then there's the matter of segregated buses, which somehow slips into the report:
Ron Huldai used to be a general in our air-force. When he finished that, he went to run the Herzliya high-school in Tel Aviv - admittedly a high-profile school but still only a high-school. Most generals aim higher (or lower, when they become arms-dealers in Africa, or BMW's boss in Israel). So that was admirable. A few years later he ran for mayor, and since he keeps on getting re-elected he must be doing something right. I'm often in Tel Aviv these days, and grudgingly admit that it's not a bad-looking town; I'm even beginning to like it, in a wary sort of way. Tel Aviv is a very secular town (though Rishon Leziyon is even more so), and many Israelis from elsewhere will tell you it's a bit detached from the rest of the country. Or not, as this story indicates.
Huldai recently spoke out against the refusal of some Haredi schools to teach what's called the Core Program. This is defined as the utter minimum of modern studies that school children in Israel must have, and includes mostly some Maths and English. If parents wish their children to spend all their time studying religious things (Jewish, Arab, whatever), that's their right, so long as the children get the Core Program. Some Haredi schools object even to that, and Huldai correctly came out against them. His position is relevant because elementary schools get much of their funding through municipalities. (This paragraph has been a simplification, but it will have to do).
So far so good.
In recent years there have been a small but noticeable number of young Haredi families who have moved into Ramat Aviv, an expensive and very secular area in the north of Tel Aviv. I drove through a couple months ago and was startled to see how visible they were - well, they do rather stand out in their uniforms against the backdrop of the Ramat Aviv mall. The locals don't like them there, and especially don't like the local Chabad House - though if they understood Haredi society they'd know that Chabad isn't exactly Haredi, it's Chabad. But when dealing with stereotypes, who's counting. They're apparently especially worried about the influence Chabad is having on local teenagers, though if you ask me it would be better to offer some sort of counter influence if you're all worried about your children being enticed by something. As Cat Stevens once said, it's a wild world out there (and look what happened to him... hmmn. Maybe I shouldn't have brought that up).
Anyway, some of the locals are getting organized to stop the influx of unwanted Haredi into their neighborhood, and it appears they're demanding of their mayor that he back their position:
Huldai appears to have won substantial support from Tel Aviv's secular public after coming out against the haredi study program last month. His statements will be put to the test this week in a city council debate on the "haredization" of northern Tel Aviv.Why the one position is connected to the other, I can't say; the statement that his previous position will be tested by his position on this one is baffling. Why? It should be possible to demand that Haredi children learn maths, even when they live in Ramat Aviv - or have I missed something?
Then there's the matter of segregated buses, which somehow slips into the report:
Since the residents' campaign was launched two years ago the mayor avoided making explicit statements endorsing any one side. On Monday he will be forced to comment on a motion filed by Councilman and Attorney Reuven Ladiansky from the Let Live faction. "I intend to mention the fact that the Municipality is funding a bus line which maintains separation between male and female students in Ramat Hahayal," Ladiansky told Ynet.
These segregated buses are not about the Core Program, and are not about who lives where, but they are, as the French would say, a shande. Everybody should be against them. As a matter of fact, if Tel Aviv is in any way like Jerusalem (perish the thought), the Haredi moving out of their neighborhoods and into secular areas are probably the saner ones, those who'd like their children to grow up knowing that not everyone is Haredi, and that most people get along just fine on regular buses. The secular folks who correctly think the segregation of buses is a mishegass ought to be encouraging young Haredi couples to move into secular neighborhoods.
Have I made it all clear now? No? Well, at least I don't need to get elected to anything. Think about poor Huldai, and how he can ever extract himself from this one...
Necessary Secrets
Alan Dershowitz (a law professor) reviews Gabriel Schoenfeld's new book Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law
at the New York Times, which is interesting because Schoenfeld apparently takes some close looks at the NYT in his book. Dershowitz mostly but not completely likes the book. It just came out and I haven't read it yet, but it sure could have informed our recent discussion of the Anat Kamm case, where the assumption was that any limitation of the media's total freedom do whatever they wanted was anti-democratic heresy.
Here's Deshowitz agreeing with Schoenfeld, and also saying what should be obvious, but isn't:
at the New York Times, which is interesting because Schoenfeld apparently takes some close looks at the NYT in his book. Dershowitz mostly but not completely likes the book. It just came out and I haven't read it yet, but it sure could have informed our recent discussion of the Anat Kamm case, where the assumption was that any limitation of the media's total freedom do whatever they wanted was anti-democratic heresy.Here's Deshowitz agreeing with Schoenfeld, and also saying what should be obvious, but isn't:
I have asked Schoenfeld if he'd like to write something about the principles impacted by the Kamm case. He said might, so here's hoping.It has become an article of faith among some civil liberty absolutists to deny that there are any costs associated with disclosing secrets like the ’s high-tech program. This is part of a more general mantra of denial that covers other contentious issues as well: torture never produces actionable intelligence; capital punishment never deters; censorship never prevents harm; and a national identification system would never stop any terrorist. Each of these claims is highly questionable.
Anyone with an iota of historical knowledge must concede that torture sometimes works, as it did when Nazis tortured members of the French resistance into leading them to the hiding places of family members and friends. Recent studies suggest that capital punishment deters at least some criminals, as evidenced by the apparently higher costs of hiring a hit man in a state that executes than in one that doesn’t. Racist, sexist and homophobic speech can sometimes, as we have seen, incite violence against vulnerable victims. And a national identification system would almost certainly make it more difficult for some foreign terrorists to hide among our citizens. Constitutional rights are not cost-free.
To be sure, the arguments against torture, capital punishment, censorship and a national identification system are powerful. Still, honesty demands that the benefits of absolute adherence to a maximalist view of rights be weighed against their costs. Schoenfeld simply but persuasively demands an honest accounting by those who would make the case for publishing national security secrets in real time.
Eli Cohen on Radio Damascus
Eli Cohen has iconic status in Israel, in spite of being dead 45 years already.
Cohen was an Israeli spy planted in Damascus in 1961, purportedly as a returning emigre from South America. He successfully penetrated government circles, eventually being mooted for a position as deputy secretary of defense. In 1965 he was identified, arrested, tortured and tried, before being publicly hanged in the center of Damascus.
His activity apparently contributed significantly to Israel's ability to beat the Syrian defenses on the Golan in 1967.
His remains have never been returned, in spite of Israeli attempts to include them in exchanges of prisoners following the three wars we've had with Syria since his hanging.
Someone has now dug up a recording of an interview he gave Radio Damascus not long before his arrest. You can't be an Israeli and not listen to this voice from the past with fascination.
Cohen was an Israeli spy planted in Damascus in 1961, purportedly as a returning emigre from South America. He successfully penetrated government circles, eventually being mooted for a position as deputy secretary of defense. In 1965 he was identified, arrested, tortured and tried, before being publicly hanged in the center of Damascus.
His activity apparently contributed significantly to Israel's ability to beat the Syrian defenses on the Golan in 1967.
His remains have never been returned, in spite of Israeli attempts to include them in exchanges of prisoners following the three wars we've had with Syria since his hanging.
Someone has now dug up a recording of an interview he gave Radio Damascus not long before his arrest. You can't be an Israeli and not listen to this voice from the past with fascination.
Flotilla of the Vanities
Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel point out that no-one involved in the story of the flotilla approaching Gaza today has much interest in the people of Gaza.
It is highly doubtful that the convoy's organizers have the well being of Gaza's residents as their top priority. The cargo on the ships, even if it does reach Gaza, will not effect the average Gazan's condition - we have learned over the three years since the revolution in Gaza (12 June 2007) that the Hamas government isn’t very different from its predecessors regarding its citizens' welfare. In the days of severe fuel shortage, Hamas leaders' vehicles were the only cars that traveled feely. The taxes the government placed on Gazan residents were not meant to improve their lives, but rather to make sure the Hamas rule does not crumble. Freeing Gilad Shalit would have most likely ended the siege, but the organization is in no hurry to do that - again, due to the political accounts it wishes to close.
The flotilla is meant to serve the organization on the international front and depict Israel as a cruel country that harms innocent Palestinians.
Sadly, however, Israel looks likely to play into their hands, since someone on our side has also decided to assign great importance to what is no more than a publicity stunt:
The problem is, as stated, that that Israeli government helped glorify the flotilla. It is difficult to understand why an alternative solution was not fully considered, such as stopping the ships, searching them, and then letting them through. Even if hundreds of Muslim and European activists enter Gaza accompanied by an Israeli MK, it will be incomparable to the damage to Israel's image from the media coverage of a confrontation between its Navy's commando and unarmed citizens. But it's too late now: Stopping the flotilla has become a test of Israel's power of deterrence.
Isn't it great we have such wise leaders?
Saturday, May 29, 2010
Killing Afghan Civilians in Nevada
OK, that's a misleading title, I admit. The killing of 23 Afghan civilians was done in Afghanistan, of course, when they were rocketed from a helicopter in February this year. Yet a key role in the identifying of the target, three vehicles driving along some dusty road not near any American troops, was done by some drone operators sitting in a facility in Nevada; they watched the three cars for three hours before directing the attack.
Once the extent of the mistake became clear there was a serious investigation, and four American officers were reprimanded. The whole story is summed up in the New York Times, here. I recommend reading it.
As I never tire of saying, I'm in favor of the American war in Afghanistan. It's a just war, being waged mostly with just means, and when mistakes are inevitably made, the Americans seem to be doing their best to learn from them and not repeat them. Still, reading the report does raise a number of points.
1. The deaths of 23 Afghan civilians is truly tragic. No ifs and buts.
2. It is now commonplace for deaths in combat zones to be the result of actions taken by well-fed, well-clothed professionals sitting in air-conditioned facilities literally half way around the world from the events. These professionals have probably never heard shots fired in anger, if they've heard shots fired at all; they are in no personal danger at any time, cannot plead to have operated under the stress of battle conditions nor emotional turmoil caused by, say, violence threatening their families. Nor do they have any personal experience of the land they're attacking: it's appearance, smells and sounds, nor, bizarre as it ought to sound but probably no longer does, any personal encounters with any of the people of the nation their actions are impacting upon.
3. The investigation seems to have been done entirely by military investigatory outfits. No so-called "independent investigations" were involved.
4. The identity of the investigators and their institutional proximity to the targets of the investigation raise no eyebrows. No-one is demanding that civilians investigate the military, and no-one's dreaming of bring in the United Nations, or any other international outfit.
5. No-one assumes that if civilians died, it must be that civilians were intended to die.
6. All of this in spite of the fact that the killings apparently took place in a sparsely populated rural area, and even according to the report, there were indications that not all was well, and that women and children might have been present, even before the attack; the attack happened some seven miles from the nearest American ground forces, if I'm reading the story correctly.
One of the reasons I read the entire 575-page Goldstone report, as well as many other shorter documents, was to understand how Israel's enemies operate. The modes of thought and speech they routinely use against Israel are totally lacking in this report: not surprising, of course, but important to keep in mind. There are various wars going on these days, but Israel is judged by uniquely harsh and negative standards.
Once the extent of the mistake became clear there was a serious investigation, and four American officers were reprimanded. The whole story is summed up in the New York Times, here. I recommend reading it.
As I never tire of saying, I'm in favor of the American war in Afghanistan. It's a just war, being waged mostly with just means, and when mistakes are inevitably made, the Americans seem to be doing their best to learn from them and not repeat them. Still, reading the report does raise a number of points.
1. The deaths of 23 Afghan civilians is truly tragic. No ifs and buts.
2. It is now commonplace for deaths in combat zones to be the result of actions taken by well-fed, well-clothed professionals sitting in air-conditioned facilities literally half way around the world from the events. These professionals have probably never heard shots fired in anger, if they've heard shots fired at all; they are in no personal danger at any time, cannot plead to have operated under the stress of battle conditions nor emotional turmoil caused by, say, violence threatening their families. Nor do they have any personal experience of the land they're attacking: it's appearance, smells and sounds, nor, bizarre as it ought to sound but probably no longer does, any personal encounters with any of the people of the nation their actions are impacting upon.
3. The investigation seems to have been done entirely by military investigatory outfits. No so-called "independent investigations" were involved.
4. The identity of the investigators and their institutional proximity to the targets of the investigation raise no eyebrows. No-one is demanding that civilians investigate the military, and no-one's dreaming of bring in the United Nations, or any other international outfit.
5. No-one assumes that if civilians died, it must be that civilians were intended to die.
6. All of this in spite of the fact that the killings apparently took place in a sparsely populated rural area, and even according to the report, there were indications that not all was well, and that women and children might have been present, even before the attack; the attack happened some seven miles from the nearest American ground forces, if I'm reading the story correctly.
One of the reasons I read the entire 575-page Goldstone report, as well as many other shorter documents, was to understand how Israel's enemies operate. The modes of thought and speech they routinely use against Israel are totally lacking in this report: not surprising, of course, but important to keep in mind. There are various wars going on these days, but Israel is judged by uniquely harsh and negative standards.
Friday, May 28, 2010
South African Documents
I've been having less and less time for blogging, as you may have noticed, and decided not to get into the story of the new book about Israeli-South African collaboration in the 1970s. I haven't read the book, I have no doubt that particular chapter of Israel's history is not its most glorious, I doubt Israel was less cynical than France, the UK or the USA, and I'm not convinced today's critics come to the discussion with clean hands. Realpolitik is often an ugly thing to observe, but one of the finest things about Zionism is that it enabled the Jews to engage in it as a nation, rather than be shoved around by others with realpolitik reasons not to come to our aid. That's what having power means, and it's definitely better to have it than not to have it. Ask the Darfuri.
The folks at CiFWatch however have been working hard on the matter, as you can see here, here and here, and apparently with more to come. I like the way they're going at it: by carefully and precisely reading the documents. When I was younger I once wrote a doctoral thesis, which contained an entire chapter about the art of figuring out what documents really say, not what folks carelessly say they say; it was eventually published in one of those books over on the left of the blog. A careful reading of documents, it turns out, often results with a different understanding than a careless one.
The folks at CiFWatch however have been working hard on the matter, as you can see here, here and here, and apparently with more to come. I like the way they're going at it: by carefully and precisely reading the documents. When I was younger I once wrote a doctoral thesis, which contained an entire chapter about the art of figuring out what documents really say, not what folks carelessly say they say; it was eventually published in one of those books over on the left of the blog. A careful reading of documents, it turns out, often results with a different understanding than a careless one.
We See Our World Through Our Cultur
Victor has an amusing post about how folks from Russia see a particular event: it's apparently done differently than in Berkeley.
Thursday, May 27, 2010
The Plumbing of Israeli Democracy: FARA
In recent months we have been warned repeatedly about the erosion of democratic freedoms in Israel. One of the top alleged dangers is a proposed law requiring transparency about foreign sources of funding. The New York Times recently gave the NGOs a platform to explain the danger:
Perhaps the most alarming sign to rights advocates was a preliminary vote in Parliament supporting a bill that called for groups that received support from foreign governments to register with Israel’s political parties’ registrar, which could change their tax status and hamper their ability to raise money abroad. It swept a preliminary vote in the 120-seat Parliament in February with 58 in favor and 11 against. Proponents say the bill is needed to improve transparency. “Up until now they have enjoyed a halo effect as highly regarded human rights watchdogs,” said Gerald Steinberg, an Israeli political scientist and president of NGO Monitor, a conservative watchdog group financed by American Jewish philanthropists. “They were not seen as political organizations with biases and prone to false claims. Now, they are coming under some kind of scrutiny.”But rights organizations say that they are already required to list publicly the sources of their funding, and that the bill is actually intended to stifle dissent.
Asher Fredman, an aide involved in the legislative process, reports:
Sound reasonable to me. The process of legislation in a democracy is structured to enable changes so that the final result reflect the positions of different groups. This doesn't mean that everyone gets everything they want; some players will be called upon to adapt, even if they'd prefer not. Feldman describes how the NGOs expressed their dislike of this aspect:While ignoring the issues of transparency and foreign interests, the NGOs have focused most of their attacks on a clause that was dropped in the early negotiations over the bill. The clause would have removed tax-exempt status, intended for organizations "promoting the public good," from organizations heavily engaged in Israel's most contentious political debates. Whatever the merits of the clause, its fate demonstrates the robustness of Israel's admittedly imperfect parliamentary democracy.
The bill, largely modeled on longstanding US legislation known as the FARA Act, was first discussed at a Knesset conference on foreign government funding. The organizers, in the spirit of democratic discussion, offered the leaders of five of the most powerful NGOs, the NIF, B'Tselem, ACRI, Adalah and Gisha, an open platform. All refused to take part. The NGOs then contacted MKs from the Left and warned them against participating. The proposed legislation would expand the funding information that NGOs must report, require timelier reporting, and ensure that this information is readily available to the public. Some NGOs already meet these standards of transparency; most do not.What's not clear is how this legislation came to be portrayed as anti-democratic. After all, it's apparently based on the FARA Act, and American law. Here is the relevant section from the website of the United States Department of Justice:
- FARA is short for the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq
The purpose of FARA is to insure that the U.S. Government and the people of the United States are informed of the source of information (propaganda) and the identity of persons attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy, and laws. In 1938, FARA was Congress' response to the large number of German propaganda agents in the pre-WWII U.S.. - The term also includes foreign political parties, a person or organization outside the United States, except U. S. citizens, and any entity organized under the laws of a foreign country or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.
1. The Act requires every agent of a foreign principal, not otherwise exempt, to register with the Department of Justice and file forms outlining its agreements with, income from, and expenditures on behalf of the foreign principal. These forms are public records and must be supplemented every six months.
2. The Act also requires that informational materials (formerly propaganda) be labeled with a conspicuous statement that the information is disseminated by the agents on behalf of the foreign principal. The agent must provide copies of such materials to the Attorney General.
3. Any agent testifying before a committee of Congress must furnish the committee with a copy of his most recent registration statement.
4. The agent must keep records of all his activities and permit the Attorney General to inspect them.- One must register within ten days of agreeing to become an agent and before performing any activities for the foreign principal.
- A cursory scanning seems to indicate that the Israeli version will be less intrusive and narrower than the American original. Interesting how the NYT missed that angle of the story.
Amnesty International and Israel's Court System
You may perhaps recollect how Amnesty International was displeased with Israel, some two weeks back, for arresting Ameer Makhoul. Israel was harassing him for his activities as the boss of an NGO, and AI was threatening to describe him as a prisoner of conscience, no less. They also called upon Israel, in the unlikely case it had evidence against him, to bring him to trial in accordance with international fair trial standards. (For the full text of their position, see here).
The Israeli police has completed its investigation, the prosecution has written up an indictment and presented it to court, and it turns out he's being accused of rather serious crimes. Here's a summary of them.
Of course, we don't know if he's guilty. That's what trials are for. Nor do we know if he's innocent, even though AI made up its mind long ago, apparently, otherwise their communique of May 13th would be malicious and unprofessional.
I am sending this to my old acquaintance Neil Durkin, who works in the press department of AI; perhaps he'll be able to clarify matters for us.
(h/t Yair)
The Israeli police has completed its investigation, the prosecution has written up an indictment and presented it to court, and it turns out he's being accused of rather serious crimes. Here's a summary of them.
Of course, we don't know if he's guilty. That's what trials are for. Nor do we know if he's innocent, even though AI made up its mind long ago, apparently, otherwise their communique of May 13th would be malicious and unprofessional.
I am sending this to my old acquaintance Neil Durkin, who works in the press department of AI; perhaps he'll be able to clarify matters for us.
(h/t Yair)
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
The Universal Significance of Sri Lanka
Did the Nazi attempt to kill all the Jews warn mankind against ever trying again, or does it serve as a pilot project, to be improved upon next time? Must it even be an either-or thing? Maybe the Germans learned one thing, and the Islamists - the other? The one things that's certain is that mankind did not learn from the Holocaust to desist from genocide.
The Economist reports that a growing club of countries is sending its strongmen to Sri Lanka to learn how to destroy a terrorist threat. Inevitably they've got Israel on the list, but if you set that aside, it's an important but depressing development.
Many of us wish the trajectory of the human story was away from warfare and violence. Too many people, however, also believe this is reality, not merely a wish. Similar to the question about killing all the Jews, it may even be both: certainly in non-Balkan Europe, violence and warfare are utterly out of fashion - but not in the rest of the world, Not at all. This is probably not a blip, or an aberration, but a reflection of age-old human nature.
The Economist reports that a growing club of countries is sending its strongmen to Sri Lanka to learn how to destroy a terrorist threat. Inevitably they've got Israel on the list, but if you set that aside, it's an important but depressing development.
Many of us wish the trajectory of the human story was away from warfare and violence. Too many people, however, also believe this is reality, not merely a wish. Similar to the question about killing all the Jews, it may even be both: certainly in non-Balkan Europe, violence and warfare are utterly out of fashion - but not in the rest of the world, Not at all. This is probably not a blip, or an aberration, but a reflection of age-old human nature.
Preparedness Takes Lots of Preparation
We're having a week-long nationwide Home Front defense drill. Granted, the entire nation is a bit small, about the size of New Jersey with fewer people, but it's hard to overestimate the importance of such preparations. A drill such as this is planned for an entire year, and thousands of people are involved in the process. Should a missile land on a water station it's not obvious that the water company's teams will know, and will know what to do about it, and will know how to equip themselves, and will know how to get there; if the phone system, the electric system and the mobile phone system have all crashed, and the roads are jammed with vehicles trying to reach the hospitals, how does that water company team come together and fix the problem? And if the problem can't be fixed today, how will water be distributed and who announces it how?
This is merely one scenario, for one municipal water company. Multiply it by all the other things that can go wrong all over the country, and throw in the need to fight and win a war as quickly as possible because the enemy has more rockets and will keep on shooting them for as long as it can unless it's stopped.
If and when it happens (I tend, alas, to the When camp) there will inevitably be mass chaos. Having thousands of people in all the relevant agencies who have at least thought about it, have tried to imagine all the scenarios, have mooted solutions, and perhaps even experimented with the ones that will inevitably be not what happens - all this is crucial. It will be the difference between life and death for people who at the moment are simply going about their ordinary lives.
It will also mean that when the war comes, our preparations will be vastly better than those of the other side, so that the televised chaos over there will look worse, the ability to recuperate will be held up as proof the danger wasn't so dramatic, and the "proportionality brigade" of self anointed legal experts will swing into action, followed by the world's media, then the UN, and eventually even some of America's anguished Jews. This is all inevitable, but quite irrelevant. Should we refrain from trying to prepare for the worst so as to win some world opinion brownie points for our suffering? Of course not.
This is merely one scenario, for one municipal water company. Multiply it by all the other things that can go wrong all over the country, and throw in the need to fight and win a war as quickly as possible because the enemy has more rockets and will keep on shooting them for as long as it can unless it's stopped.
If and when it happens (I tend, alas, to the When camp) there will inevitably be mass chaos. Having thousands of people in all the relevant agencies who have at least thought about it, have tried to imagine all the scenarios, have mooted solutions, and perhaps even experimented with the ones that will inevitably be not what happens - all this is crucial. It will be the difference between life and death for people who at the moment are simply going about their ordinary lives.
It will also mean that when the war comes, our preparations will be vastly better than those of the other side, so that the televised chaos over there will look worse, the ability to recuperate will be held up as proof the danger wasn't so dramatic, and the "proportionality brigade" of self anointed legal experts will swing into action, followed by the world's media, then the UN, and eventually even some of America's anguished Jews. This is all inevitable, but quite irrelevant. Should we refrain from trying to prepare for the worst so as to win some world opinion brownie points for our suffering? Of course not.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
A Case of Antisemitism
Adam Kirsch reviews Antony Julius' new book on English antisemitism. In passing, he links to Harold Bloom's previous review, in the NYT, which I already linked to here. Kirsch, however, also noticed the readers' responses to Bloom's review, as published in the Letters section. Five letters were published, each one of them critical in one way or the other of.... Bloom. Well, none of the writers had read the book, so they criticized the messenger. I haven't read the book either, yet, but I'm struck by how shallow the criticism seems to be. One letter writer trots out the fact that there are lots of prominent Jews in today's UK politics, so there can't be much antisemitism around, can there. Most interesting, however, was the response of Prof. James Wood of the department of literary criticism at Harvard.
Yep.
...In place of this precise slander and imprecise imputation, Bloom might have noted that some of the most robust left-wing discussion of Israeli policy has come from members of the British literary and academic establishment who are also Jewish (Tony Judt, Harold Pinter, Mike Leigh, Jacqueline Rose). If there is more political discussion of this order in Britain than in America it is not necessarily because the English are so anti-Semitic — or at least, I certainly hope not — but more likely (as Judt has pointed out) because most Americans live in almost complete ignorance of the “fierce relevance” of certain political realities and facts.
Yep.
Reflections about the Edge of the Jewish World
There's been too much excitement around here recently about matters that may well not be remembered six months from now, not to say six years. Time to take a longer look at things that have survived all tests of time.
The late Second Temple era saw the greatest diversity of cultural and religious creation in the Jewish world, to an extent not replicated until the 20th century. In spite of considerable political turmoil and occasional wars, Jews allowed themselves to express their Jewishness in all sorts of ways, some of them hardly mutually compatible. Not everyone liked it that way, and at times the arguments turned violent. Still, so long as there was a temple in Jerusalem which everyone could accept as the center, everyone muddled along.
Immediately after the destruction the rabbinic authorities focused like a laser (they wouldn't have recognized my term): if you're with us, this is how we do Judaism; if you don't, you're out. Good-by, and good riddance. Quite a gamble, if you stop to think about it, but they were uncompromising. Nor was this a temporary measure: it went on for centuries - arguably, more than a millennium. A long time indeed.
The story of Ben Sira can demonstrate this - sort of.
Ben Sira is a book written in Hebrew around 200 BCE, give or take a generation. Its author probably thought he was writing a treatise about ethical behaviour, and had someone told him that later on some such treatises would be canonized into the Bible, he might have expected his to be included. In any case, it was regarded as a religious tome.
It was also translated to Greek, apparently by the author's grandson, which was a good thing because when the laser started cutting things out, 200 years later, Ben Sira was out. The practical implication was that it wasn't copied and recopied in Hebrew, nor learned by heart as the oral tradition was, and so was lost; the Greek version, however, having entered the Septuagint, waspreserved; in some traditions it is even part of the New Testament (in Greek it's called Sirach). Only in the 20th century were largish sections of the original Hebrew discovered, in the Cairo Geniza and on Massada. (More on the book, here).
One of the operators of that laser was rabbi Akiva, and there's a Mishna in Sanhedrin where he rules that Jews who read the wrong books (Sefarim Hitzoni'im, external books) won't go to heaven. On page 100b there is then a fascinating discussion among Amora'im, another few centuries on, about Ben Sira: the rabbis agree that rabbi Akiva had it on his list of forbidden books, but they're not quite certain why. The entire page is a series of quotations from the book (by now 500 years old, and say 250 years since the casting out) which are evaluated: this saying is OK, that one isn't and must have been what generated rabbi Akiva's ire, oh come on that's harmless, maybe it was this section.
You get my point: it's forbidden literature, but the rabbis know it by heart, even as they shudder over it's content (or not). Did the general Jewish public also know it? I expect not, but I doubt anyone really knows. It's hard enough figuring out what people think right now; reconstructing popular literacy at a distance of 1700 years is impossible.
That was my first story about the edge of Jewish identity. Here's a second, which appears on page 102b in Sanhedrin.
The Mishna lists three Biblical kings who were not allowed into heaven: Yerovam, Ahab and Menashe. Rav Ashi (later 4th century CE) once told his students in the yeshiva that their next day's lesson would deal with "our friends" or perhaps "our collegues" (haverin), those three kings (he was saying they were scholars before they were sinners) - and note how the Gemara observes itself in action: rav Ashi is teaching it and is in it, simultaneously. That's what you get when you spend 700 years creating one book.
That night Menashe appeared to rav Ashi in his dream:
- You dare call us your colleagues? (who do you think you are, little upstart). If you think you know so much, tell me from what part of the loaf are you to eat first upon blessing over the bread?
- I don't know.
- Such a simple thing, you don't know it, and you dare call yourself our colleague?
- So tell me, and I'll teach it tomorrow in class, in your name.
- You eat first from right under the crust.
- If you know so much (if you're such a scholar, this is rav Ashi asking the terrible sinner Menashe), how come you (and the other sinners) succumbed to idolatry?
- Ah, what do you know. Had you been alive in those days, you'd have raised the hem of your garment so as to run faster to worship those idols, so great was their attraction.
Then next morning, the Gemara tells us, rav Ashi opened his lecture by saying: Today we'll learn from our rabbis (our betters, not our colleagues).
Defining the edges seems to have been problematic, even in the days when doing it was an existential imperative.
[This thread started and is explained here]
The late Second Temple era saw the greatest diversity of cultural and religious creation in the Jewish world, to an extent not replicated until the 20th century. In spite of considerable political turmoil and occasional wars, Jews allowed themselves to express their Jewishness in all sorts of ways, some of them hardly mutually compatible. Not everyone liked it that way, and at times the arguments turned violent. Still, so long as there was a temple in Jerusalem which everyone could accept as the center, everyone muddled along.
Immediately after the destruction the rabbinic authorities focused like a laser (they wouldn't have recognized my term): if you're with us, this is how we do Judaism; if you don't, you're out. Good-by, and good riddance. Quite a gamble, if you stop to think about it, but they were uncompromising. Nor was this a temporary measure: it went on for centuries - arguably, more than a millennium. A long time indeed.
The story of Ben Sira can demonstrate this - sort of.
Ben Sira is a book written in Hebrew around 200 BCE, give or take a generation. Its author probably thought he was writing a treatise about ethical behaviour, and had someone told him that later on some such treatises would be canonized into the Bible, he might have expected his to be included. In any case, it was regarded as a religious tome.
It was also translated to Greek, apparently by the author's grandson, which was a good thing because when the laser started cutting things out, 200 years later, Ben Sira was out. The practical implication was that it wasn't copied and recopied in Hebrew, nor learned by heart as the oral tradition was, and so was lost; the Greek version, however, having entered the Septuagint, waspreserved; in some traditions it is even part of the New Testament (in Greek it's called Sirach). Only in the 20th century were largish sections of the original Hebrew discovered, in the Cairo Geniza and on Massada. (More on the book, here).
One of the operators of that laser was rabbi Akiva, and there's a Mishna in Sanhedrin where he rules that Jews who read the wrong books (Sefarim Hitzoni'im, external books) won't go to heaven. On page 100b there is then a fascinating discussion among Amora'im, another few centuries on, about Ben Sira: the rabbis agree that rabbi Akiva had it on his list of forbidden books, but they're not quite certain why. The entire page is a series of quotations from the book (by now 500 years old, and say 250 years since the casting out) which are evaluated: this saying is OK, that one isn't and must have been what generated rabbi Akiva's ire, oh come on that's harmless, maybe it was this section.
You get my point: it's forbidden literature, but the rabbis know it by heart, even as they shudder over it's content (or not). Did the general Jewish public also know it? I expect not, but I doubt anyone really knows. It's hard enough figuring out what people think right now; reconstructing popular literacy at a distance of 1700 years is impossible.
That was my first story about the edge of Jewish identity. Here's a second, which appears on page 102b in Sanhedrin.
The Mishna lists three Biblical kings who were not allowed into heaven: Yerovam, Ahab and Menashe. Rav Ashi (later 4th century CE) once told his students in the yeshiva that their next day's lesson would deal with "our friends" or perhaps "our collegues" (haverin), those three kings (he was saying they were scholars before they were sinners) - and note how the Gemara observes itself in action: rav Ashi is teaching it and is in it, simultaneously. That's what you get when you spend 700 years creating one book.
That night Menashe appeared to rav Ashi in his dream:
- You dare call us your colleagues? (who do you think you are, little upstart). If you think you know so much, tell me from what part of the loaf are you to eat first upon blessing over the bread?
- I don't know.
- Such a simple thing, you don't know it, and you dare call yourself our colleague?
- So tell me, and I'll teach it tomorrow in class, in your name.
- You eat first from right under the crust.
- If you know so much (if you're such a scholar, this is rav Ashi asking the terrible sinner Menashe), how come you (and the other sinners) succumbed to idolatry?
- Ah, what do you know. Had you been alive in those days, you'd have raised the hem of your garment so as to run faster to worship those idols, so great was their attraction.
Then next morning, the Gemara tells us, rav Ashi opened his lecture by saying: Today we'll learn from our rabbis (our betters, not our colleagues).
Defining the edges seems to have been problematic, even in the days when doing it was an existential imperative.
[This thread started and is explained here]
Monday, May 24, 2010
Peering Through the Fog
I had lunch today with a fellow who knows way more than I do about American Jewry (his alias is Goldblog, but I'm not authorized to disclose his real name). I learned all sorts of interesting things, but came away mostly with an enhanced recognition of how little I really know about the subject. This, in spite of having lived some of my years in the US and among its Jews; speaking their language; following some of their writings; visiting about once a year; and knowing some of them personally (cousins, nephews, colleagues, neighbors who split their time between both countries, etc.) It wouldn't be too much of an exaggeration to say that some of my best friends are American Jews. (I also have friends who aren't American, or aren't Jews, or aren't any of all that - but that's a different story).
Seen from here, it's hard to know which of the following reports is more representative:
Fifth Avenue Salutes Israel, about a mass event in Manhattan that was deemed important enough to attract just about every New York politician who needs to be elected:
Seen from here, it's hard to know which of the following reports is more representative:
Fifth Avenue Salutes Israel, about a mass event in Manhattan that was deemed important enough to attract just about every New York politician who needs to be elected:
Hundreds of thousands of people took part in the Salute to Israel Parade on New York City's Fifth Avenue Sunday. Participants danced to the tunes of Hebrew music, waved Israeli and American flags, and carried heart warming posters in support of the Jewish state across the ocean.Or perhaps this, from The Tablet:
...I am deeply ambivalent about Israel. Modern-day Israel, as opposed to historical Israel, is a subject I avoid with my children. Yes, of course I believe the state should exist, but the word “Zionist” makes me skittish. (I understand that I may be the Jewish equivalent of all the twentysomething women I want to smack for saying, “I’m not a feminist, but I believe in equal rights.”) I shy away from conversations about Israeli politics. I feel no stirring in my heart when I see the Israeli flag. I would no sooner attend an Israel Day parade than a Justin Bieber concert. Neither Abe Foxman nor AIPAC speaks for me. I am a liberal, and I am deeply troubled by the Matzav, Israeli shorthand for tension with the Palestinians, and I do not have answers, and I do not know what to do about it, and I do not know what to tell my children. So, it was with a huge sense of identification and relief that I read Peter Beinart’s controversial essay in the New York Review of Books last week.
The two are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and there's nothing wrong with a large Jewish community having diverse and even contradictory positions or trends. Knowing the Jews, it would be impossible otherwise. My point is that seen from here, it's essentially impossible to figure out what's going on, who's got the upper hand, who is the face of the future and who not, and so on.
All of which is to wish that Peter Beinart and his many comrades in ignorance would pontificate a wee bit less about all the things that are wrong about Israel, even as his very choice of sources, not to mention his outlandish conclusions, speak volumes mostly to his lack of information.
Yesterday he followed up his previous piece with one called Why Israel has to do Better, which mostly left me scratching my head in perplexity. It contains ideas such as that the Palestinian leaders since Arafat are eager to reach a two-state solution but Israel isn't (Ehud Olmert, anyone?); settlements are ever encroaching on Palestinian land and pulling them out will cause civil war (Gaza, anyone? - Not to mention that the myth of the encroaching is true only if you cast the facts in a very specific way); Hamas and Fatah would have created a unity government amenable to negotiating with Israel in 2007, but Israel and America thwarted them (How, exactly, did they manage, and how come it was never reported in any knowledgeable media outlet I've seen, not even Haaretz?); Israel is at least partially to blame for the Hamas rockets from Gaza - he actually does say that. And so on. He has also allowed Edit Zertal and Akiva Eldar to convince him that the settlers are a cancer in the Israeli polity, and someone has convinced him that the Haredim have taken over Jerusalem (Nir Barkat, anyone?).
I'll allow him a pass about the cancer in the polity one. It's conceivable he's simply ignorant about the heritage and provenance of that term, though it's not an ignorance to be proud of.
At the end of his litany of myths, distortions, inventions and shabby propaganda, he gives us an insight about his motives, and they aren't a deep need to understand what Israel is about:
One last point. Leon, Jeff, Jon, Jamie, David and I are all Jews. In some sense, therefore, Israel’s crimes—unlike those of Hamas or Ahmedinejad—are committed in our name. We have a special obligation to expose and confront them. And we have a special obligation not to use the crimes of Israel’s enemies to excuse behavior that dishonors a Jewish state, and the Jewish ethical tradition that we all consider precious.
He's apologetic; Israel besmirches his name.
I bow to no one in matters of morality, which is a stronger word than ethics, but when Beinart cites our common tradition I'm not certain it really is. His version doesn't look all that much like the one I know about.
The Plumbing of Israeli Democracy: Rubi Rivlin
Since so many people out there are so busy assuring us that Israeli democracy has gone off the tracks - and yes, they're aided and abetted by a tiny minority of Israelis who certainly know better - it occurs to me there may be value in an occasional series looking into the plumbing of Israeli democracy. Here's the first installment.
According to Israeli law, members of Knesset enjoy legal immunity from prosecution. Unfortunately, over the years there have been cases of MKs engaging in criminal acts: this is a fact, regrettable as it may be. In order to enable MKs to be tried, a Knesset committee must first hear some of the evidence and revoke the immunity of the MK on that specific matter (or, rarely, not revoke it. That has also happened). This morning there was a discussion in the relevant committee on a proposal to revoke the immunity of some Arab MKs who recently visited Libya.
The proposal was authored by Dr. Michael ben Ari, the most extreme right-wing MK of the present Knesset, who is in the opposition. He didn't garner the votes he needed, but some of the MKs felt they'd like to use the subject for a spot of additional grandstanding before quashing it, so they delayed the vote until next week. Interestingly, Rubi Rivlin, the Speaker of the House, took the highly unusual step of participating in the discussion, because he felt strongly about it: against, obviously:
Which is the way it should be, and also just what you'd expect.
According to Israeli law, members of Knesset enjoy legal immunity from prosecution. Unfortunately, over the years there have been cases of MKs engaging in criminal acts: this is a fact, regrettable as it may be. In order to enable MKs to be tried, a Knesset committee must first hear some of the evidence and revoke the immunity of the MK on that specific matter (or, rarely, not revoke it. That has also happened). This morning there was a discussion in the relevant committee on a proposal to revoke the immunity of some Arab MKs who recently visited Libya.
The proposal was authored by Dr. Michael ben Ari, the most extreme right-wing MK of the present Knesset, who is in the opposition. He didn't garner the votes he needed, but some of the MKs felt they'd like to use the subject for a spot of additional grandstanding before quashing it, so they delayed the vote until next week. Interestingly, Rubi Rivlin, the Speaker of the House, took the highly unusual step of participating in the discussion, because he felt strongly about it: against, obviously:
The Knesset speaker said, "Limiting the freedom of expression and narrowing the Knesset members' steps is a dangerous, slippery slope, which will end in tyranny and the nullification of the minority." Rivlin added that revoking the MKs immunity could serve as a double-edged sword and equally harm the other end of the political spectrum. "Today, it is the Arab minority, and tomorrow it will be another minority. Such things have happened in the past.Rivlin, as all of us know, is from the right wing of Likud. He's not a lefty, nor even a centrist. He's staunchly and proudly right-wing. Which of course doesn't preclude his taking a clear position in favor of freedom of speech, be it of people of his persuasion or a very different persuasion.
Which is the way it should be, and also just what you'd expect.
The Invention of Life
Here's a layman's guide to what the scientists are up to. It's complicated. It's fascinating. It's profoundly frightening. It's wildly exciting.
It will change the world. It won't change human nature.
It will change the world. It won't change human nature.
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Limiting Freedom of Speech, Eroding Democracy
If you believe the NIF, Israel's radicals, Peter Beinart or many others, Israel is going through a crises of democracy, freedom of speech is under attack, oppositional organizations are being persecuted and things are generally going downhill in Israel. It's ugly.
It's also nonsense, as I've been describing relentlessly for quite a while.
Here's a description from a faraway land. It tells not about grandstanding and mooted ideas about changes to the laws that will never happen, but rather about laws that are already on the books, laws that limit the ability to organize freely, draconian requirements for total transparency about sources of funds for political purposes - and as a freebie, one of the matters that has sparked the discussion is the intention of the government to demolish homes of poor people to make way for rich folks.
I dare anyone to find Israeli laws that look anything like this, the ones currently on the book or the ones being discussed that will never be enacted.
The faraway land, you ask? The state of Washington. And Alabama. And 34 others.
It's also nonsense, as I've been describing relentlessly for quite a while.
Here's a description from a faraway land. It tells not about grandstanding and mooted ideas about changes to the laws that will never happen, but rather about laws that are already on the books, laws that limit the ability to organize freely, draconian requirements for total transparency about sources of funds for political purposes - and as a freebie, one of the matters that has sparked the discussion is the intention of the government to demolish homes of poor people to make way for rich folks.
I dare anyone to find Israeli laws that look anything like this, the ones currently on the book or the ones being discussed that will never be enacted.
The faraway land, you ask? The state of Washington. And Alabama. And 34 others.
Don't Divide Jerusalem: Mamila
People who look forward to the division of Jerusalem between Israel and Palestine assume and hope the division will lead to peaceful coexistence and good will to replace a century of hatred bloodshed war and suffering. A noble hope. Yet they must also take into account the possibility it won't. Dividing Jerusalem will inevitably be a gamble.
In this installation of the series of thinking about what dividing Jerusalem will really look like, on the ground, I'm returning to Mamila.
Mamila is the neighborhood directly outside the Jaffa Gate. It was founded in the late 19th century. In 1920, when the local Arabs launched their first-ever large-scale attack on their Jewish neighbors, looting raping and murdering six Jews, Mamila was one of the places they assaulted. Between 1948 and 1967 the eastern edge of the neighborhood was in no-man's-land between Jordan and Israel; Mamila street was blocked by a high concrete wall to allow the locals to walk on it without being shot by Jordanian snipers of the wall of the Old City. (There were many cases of sniping in those bad days).
Here's a picture of the wall, unfortunately scanned with a low resolution so you can't see the details, but the photographer (David Krojanker) was on the Israeli side looking across the line to the Old City.
In the 1980s a project began to rebuild the neighborhood. The southern part of it is now the Mezudat David hotel and the David's Village luxury apartment project. North of Mamila Road (the part I outlined on the aerial photo above) is the Mamila shopping center, one of the more popular and tasteful shopping areas in town. It sits a literal stone's throw from the Old City; should the division of Jerusalem ever go wrong for whatever reason, there will be no need for Kassams. A simple handgun will be enough to chase all civilians out of Mamila. Here are some films I recently made there.
The previous installment of this series of posts was here, the next one is here, and here is a collection of the entire series prior to it.
In this installation of the series of thinking about what dividing Jerusalem will really look like, on the ground, I'm returning to Mamila.
Mamila is the neighborhood directly outside the Jaffa Gate. It was founded in the late 19th century. In 1920, when the local Arabs launched their first-ever large-scale attack on their Jewish neighbors, looting raping and murdering six Jews, Mamila was one of the places they assaulted. Between 1948 and 1967 the eastern edge of the neighborhood was in no-man's-land between Jordan and Israel; Mamila street was blocked by a high concrete wall to allow the locals to walk on it without being shot by Jordanian snipers of the wall of the Old City. (There were many cases of sniping in those bad days).
Here's a picture of the wall, unfortunately scanned with a low resolution so you can't see the details, but the photographer (David Krojanker) was on the Israeli side looking across the line to the Old City.
In the 1980s a project began to rebuild the neighborhood. The southern part of it is now the Mezudat David hotel and the David's Village luxury apartment project. North of Mamila Road (the part I outlined on the aerial photo above) is the Mamila shopping center, one of the more popular and tasteful shopping areas in town. It sits a literal stone's throw from the Old City; should the division of Jerusalem ever go wrong for whatever reason, there will be no need for Kassams. A simple handgun will be enough to chase all civilians out of Mamila. Here are some films I recently made there.The previous installment of this series of posts was here, the next one is here, and here is a collection of the entire series prior to it.
Destroying Palestinian Homes
Hamas is razing Palestinian homes. 20 so far, another 180 planned.
I don't expect the usual suspects will make much of a fuss, but that's obvious. I do however wonder if the Palestinian propaganda machine will ever fess up to the fact the house demolitions are not an Israeli monopoly.
I don't expect the usual suspects will make much of a fuss, but that's obvious. I do however wonder if the Palestinian propaganda machine will ever fess up to the fact the house demolitions are not an Israeli monopoly.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
Inventing Netanyahu's Past
The storm caused by the Peter Beinart article in the New York Review of Books blows on, generating lots of excitement in corners of the blogosphere that get excited by such things. I responded once, and decided not to engage any further. Beinart and most of his respondents are arguing vehemently about an Israel which doesn't exist, or at most exists in the feverish minds of a tiny number of Israelis so far to the left that they can't even be seen from where normal people live.
I'm re-engaging here to point out how fabrications about Israel become incontestable truths. Jeffrey Goldberg and Beinart are already into their third round of discussing the issues, and at one point Beinart throws in a false comment which is so deep in the general narrative that Goldberg doesn't call him on it, and may well not even have noticed it.
I recognize that 1996 was a very long time ago. Hillary lived in the White House; Elvis was recently dead (19 years); and Digital Equipment Corporation was a household name. Twitter hadn't been invented, nor Facebook, the iPhone, the blogosphere nor even Google. It was a truly benighted era. On the other hand, the Internet and even the World Wide Web already existed, as did the PC; people drove cars, not horses and buggies, and most homes in the developed lands had plumbing.Why, some of us old codgers even have (faint) memories of those far-off days in 1996.
Enough to know that Beinart's assertion is factually challenged. As a matter of fact, it's the opposite of the truth, not vaguely off mark.
Here's a short version of the story of those days.
In September 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo agreement. Rabin's popularity skyrocketed, and the agreement basked in the warm glow of 70% support in the polls, which is very high in Israeli terms. Almost immediately, however, Palestinians terrorism began to climb, contradicting what many of us had said would happen. Over the next two years, until the Fall of 1995, Israel made a string of further concessions to the Palestinians, terrorism got worse, Rabin resorted to ever harsher words to describe his opposition, and the opposition felt ever more secure they would win the next elections, scheduled for November 1996.
In October 1995 the beleaguered government launched a campaign to retake public support from the opposition; one of the central acts of this campaign was the very large demonstration of support in Tel Aviv on the night of November 5th at which Rabin was assassinated.
In the second half of November 1995, when we slowly started to climb out of our communal shock and look around us, it was clear that Netanyahu's career was over, and that Labour would win the next elections hands down. Netanyahu's role in the demonstrations against Rabin ensured that.
Early 1996 (February, if I remember correctly), Shimon Peres decided to cash in the automatic popularity he had inherited at Rabin's funeral, and moved the elections forward to May. Netanyahu didn't cave in, and set out to reposition the Likud so as to fight for the election. The centerpiece of this was to convene a series of meeting of the Likud leadership and discuss the party's position regarding the Oslo process. The meetings were closed to the media, but they were heavily covered and watched by us all.
Benny Begin was stridently against the Oslo process. Netanyahu initially stated the party had to have an answer to what it would do if it won the elections: would it do what Beinart says it did, namely reject the Oslo process, or would it do something else. I don't remember how many meetings there were. Four, perhaps, or six. The process took weeks, not days. At the end of it Netanyahu had forced the leadership of his party to formulate an acceptance of the Oslo process. It was conditional, demanding for example that Palestinian terror subside and incitement end, but it was an unequivocal acceptance of the fundamental structure of the Oslo process.
When we went to the polls in May 1996, there were parties that were campaigning on platforms of rejection of the Oslo process,but the Likud wasn't one of them. Since Netanyahu won the elections by less than one percent of the vote, it's safe to say that had he not repositioned his party, he'd have lost.
Once he won he never (never: not once) rejected the Oslo process. He slowed it down, he added conditions, he did all sorts of things. But the leader of Likud was elected in 1996 on a platform that explicitly accepted the principle of partition.
14 years later - that's all - a noticeable voice in American Jewry can glibly invent a story about Israel that contradicts the facts, and no-one calls him out on it because no-one knows any better, or if they do they join him in preferring to imagine a fantasy world rather than face reality.
One of the crucial differences between American Jews and Israelis is that Israelis have to get their decisions right; when they don't people die. Read the facts wrong, and more people will die. For American Jews it's just a subject that you talk about sometimes; facts can be a prop for a good argument.
PS. Just to be clear: I voted against Netanyahu in 1996, 1999, and again in 2009. But I try to keep my facts in good order.
Update: I originally wrote as if Elvis died in 1987. It was 1977.
I'm re-engaging here to point out how fabrications about Israel become incontestable truths. Jeffrey Goldberg and Beinart are already into their third round of discussing the issues, and at one point Beinart throws in a false comment which is so deep in the general narrative that Goldberg doesn't call him on it, and may well not even have noticed it.
...after all, Israeli governments haven't respected all past agreements--Netanyahu said explicitly that he rejected Oslo when he was elected in 1996...Black and white, simple and clear. Netanyahu said explicitly that he rejected Oslo when he was elected in 1996. No ifs or buts, no weasel words. Netanyahu rejected Oslo.
I recognize that 1996 was a very long time ago. Hillary lived in the White House; Elvis was recently dead (19 years); and Digital Equipment Corporation was a household name. Twitter hadn't been invented, nor Facebook, the iPhone, the blogosphere nor even Google. It was a truly benighted era. On the other hand, the Internet and even the World Wide Web already existed, as did the PC; people drove cars, not horses and buggies, and most homes in the developed lands had plumbing.Why, some of us old codgers even have (faint) memories of those far-off days in 1996.
Enough to know that Beinart's assertion is factually challenged. As a matter of fact, it's the opposite of the truth, not vaguely off mark.
Here's a short version of the story of those days.
In September 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo agreement. Rabin's popularity skyrocketed, and the agreement basked in the warm glow of 70% support in the polls, which is very high in Israeli terms. Almost immediately, however, Palestinians terrorism began to climb, contradicting what many of us had said would happen. Over the next two years, until the Fall of 1995, Israel made a string of further concessions to the Palestinians, terrorism got worse, Rabin resorted to ever harsher words to describe his opposition, and the opposition felt ever more secure they would win the next elections, scheduled for November 1996.
In October 1995 the beleaguered government launched a campaign to retake public support from the opposition; one of the central acts of this campaign was the very large demonstration of support in Tel Aviv on the night of November 5th at which Rabin was assassinated.
In the second half of November 1995, when we slowly started to climb out of our communal shock and look around us, it was clear that Netanyahu's career was over, and that Labour would win the next elections hands down. Netanyahu's role in the demonstrations against Rabin ensured that.
Early 1996 (February, if I remember correctly), Shimon Peres decided to cash in the automatic popularity he had inherited at Rabin's funeral, and moved the elections forward to May. Netanyahu didn't cave in, and set out to reposition the Likud so as to fight for the election. The centerpiece of this was to convene a series of meeting of the Likud leadership and discuss the party's position regarding the Oslo process. The meetings were closed to the media, but they were heavily covered and watched by us all.
Benny Begin was stridently against the Oslo process. Netanyahu initially stated the party had to have an answer to what it would do if it won the elections: would it do what Beinart says it did, namely reject the Oslo process, or would it do something else. I don't remember how many meetings there were. Four, perhaps, or six. The process took weeks, not days. At the end of it Netanyahu had forced the leadership of his party to formulate an acceptance of the Oslo process. It was conditional, demanding for example that Palestinian terror subside and incitement end, but it was an unequivocal acceptance of the fundamental structure of the Oslo process.
When we went to the polls in May 1996, there were parties that were campaigning on platforms of rejection of the Oslo process,but the Likud wasn't one of them. Since Netanyahu won the elections by less than one percent of the vote, it's safe to say that had he not repositioned his party, he'd have lost.
Once he won he never (never: not once) rejected the Oslo process. He slowed it down, he added conditions, he did all sorts of things. But the leader of Likud was elected in 1996 on a platform that explicitly accepted the principle of partition.
14 years later - that's all - a noticeable voice in American Jewry can glibly invent a story about Israel that contradicts the facts, and no-one calls him out on it because no-one knows any better, or if they do they join him in preferring to imagine a fantasy world rather than face reality.
One of the crucial differences between American Jews and Israelis is that Israelis have to get their decisions right; when they don't people die. Read the facts wrong, and more people will die. For American Jews it's just a subject that you talk about sometimes; facts can be a prop for a good argument.
PS. Just to be clear: I voted against Netanyahu in 1996, 1999, and again in 2009. But I try to keep my facts in good order.
Update: I originally wrote as if Elvis died in 1987. It was 1977.
Thursday, May 20, 2010
Polling for Peace (Or Against It)
About a year ago Dr. Colin Irwin, an Irish pollster, published the result of a large polling project he had done with two Mideast outfits, one Israeli and one Palestinian, about the positions in each society towards making peace. Since the poll still gets quoted and linked to till this day, I finally went to visit it; here's the link to it.
I'm a fan of public opinion polls only up to a degree. They can easily be manipulated. Their questions are sometimes downright misleading, or ambiguous, or unhelpful, or all of the above. There are better ways to gauge public opinion, especially in the long run: elections for example aren't bad, or long term behaviors. Still, once you've reminded yourself to keep that pinch of salt handy, polls can have their uses.
Especially one such as this, which tells us what we mostly knew anyway, this time with confidence-inspiring numbers.
72% of Palestinians think that all of Palestine should belong to the Muslim Waqf, for example. (59% think it's essential, 12% think it's desirable). 12% say that's unacceptable - yet some of them must be saying so merely because they don't like the Muslim part of the question. When it's formulated as a secular, political matter, only 7% of Palestinians think that having a Palestinians state in the entire land is an unacceptable idea, while 82% think it's a great idea. 71% go so far as to say it's essential - a figure that rather puts a damper on one's hope for peace anytime soon, I would think. Of course this doesn't quite fit the part where 38% of the Palestinians think a two-state solution is essential (another 15% think it's desirable), but life isn't always consistent. And the latter figure isn't so rosy anyway, is it.
Now compare the Palestinian insistence the Israel not be here, with Israelis' positions on having a Palestinian state next door. Only 32% think - as I do - that this is essential (even though it's not going to happen - see if you can fit that into a neat peg-hole), yet another 13% think it would be desirable, another 16% think it's acceptable, making 61% of Israelis who are comfortable with the idea of asovereign Palestine next door, to which another 17% say they can live with it even if they're not going to be happy. That's 78% of Israelis willing to live alongside Palestine, with 93% of Palestinians saying it would be better to have no Israel.
There's lots more where that came from. 54% of Palestinians won't accept settlers remaining in Beitar and Modi'in Illit; 66% wouldn't accept settlers remaining even as Palestinian citizens - not that there would be more of a handful who'd want to anyway. Divide Jerusalem according to neighborhoods (Clinton Parameters): 61% of Palestinians are against the idea. Jews remain in control of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City (founded in the year 1267): 76% of the Palestinians are against -though in this case, I'm glad to see that the Israelis are also hardly in favour of dividing Jerusalem - never fewer than 50% of them in favour of division.
Actually, it might be fun for the Israelis among us to answer all the questions ourselves and come back and report: according to this, are we to the left, right or center of the Israeli median. Didi and Alex need not bother: we know their answer.
Predictably, some pundits spun the poll as proof that the Israelis and Palestinians are equally against peace through partition. Josh Marshall, for example. Others were more clear-eyed, or perhaps they read the numbers before running to tell about them - Jonathan Chait, for example.
I'm a fan of public opinion polls only up to a degree. They can easily be manipulated. Their questions are sometimes downright misleading, or ambiguous, or unhelpful, or all of the above. There are better ways to gauge public opinion, especially in the long run: elections for example aren't bad, or long term behaviors. Still, once you've reminded yourself to keep that pinch of salt handy, polls can have their uses.
Especially one such as this, which tells us what we mostly knew anyway, this time with confidence-inspiring numbers.
72% of Palestinians think that all of Palestine should belong to the Muslim Waqf, for example. (59% think it's essential, 12% think it's desirable). 12% say that's unacceptable - yet some of them must be saying so merely because they don't like the Muslim part of the question. When it's formulated as a secular, political matter, only 7% of Palestinians think that having a Palestinians state in the entire land is an unacceptable idea, while 82% think it's a great idea. 71% go so far as to say it's essential - a figure that rather puts a damper on one's hope for peace anytime soon, I would think. Of course this doesn't quite fit the part where 38% of the Palestinians think a two-state solution is essential (another 15% think it's desirable), but life isn't always consistent. And the latter figure isn't so rosy anyway, is it.
Now compare the Palestinian insistence the Israel not be here, with Israelis' positions on having a Palestinian state next door. Only 32% think - as I do - that this is essential (even though it's not going to happen - see if you can fit that into a neat peg-hole), yet another 13% think it would be desirable, another 16% think it's acceptable, making 61% of Israelis who are comfortable with the idea of asovereign Palestine next door, to which another 17% say they can live with it even if they're not going to be happy. That's 78% of Israelis willing to live alongside Palestine, with 93% of Palestinians saying it would be better to have no Israel.
There's lots more where that came from. 54% of Palestinians won't accept settlers remaining in Beitar and Modi'in Illit; 66% wouldn't accept settlers remaining even as Palestinian citizens - not that there would be more of a handful who'd want to anyway. Divide Jerusalem according to neighborhoods (Clinton Parameters): 61% of Palestinians are against the idea. Jews remain in control of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City (founded in the year 1267): 76% of the Palestinians are against -though in this case, I'm glad to see that the Israelis are also hardly in favour of dividing Jerusalem - never fewer than 50% of them in favour of division.
Actually, it might be fun for the Israelis among us to answer all the questions ourselves and come back and report: according to this, are we to the left, right or center of the Israeli median. Didi and Alex need not bother: we know their answer.
Predictably, some pundits spun the poll as proof that the Israelis and Palestinians are equally against peace through partition. Josh Marshall, for example. Others were more clear-eyed, or perhaps they read the numbers before running to tell about them - Jonathan Chait, for example.
Obama More Plausible in Hebrew
Haaretz continues its mad rush from Israel's most serious newspaper to its most laughable. Today's' exhibit is its report on a meeting two days ago between Obama and 37 Jewish lawmakers, most of them Democrats. If you read Haaretz in English, it was a pleasant affair, at which the president made assuring noises about his administration's commitment to Israel etc etc etc. Here, see for yourself.
If however you read the Hebrew side of Haaretz, the meeting was more interesting. Obama admitted that he had made mistakes in how he approached negotiations for peace in the region, Joe Lieberman and perhaps others told him to his face that he needed to do things otherwise, and so on. Here, see for yourself.
Now since Haaretz never thought Obama was making any mistakes unless perhaps that he wasn't being forceful enough against Israel, it's easy to see why they'd now downplay any backtracking he might make. Yet the downplaying didn't happen in their Hebrew side - perhaps because they knew the meeting was going to make front-page news in some of the Hebrew-language newspapers, as it indeed did.
I wish I could cancel my subscription to the paper, but we already have.
If however you read the Hebrew side of Haaretz, the meeting was more interesting. Obama admitted that he had made mistakes in how he approached negotiations for peace in the region, Joe Lieberman and perhaps others told him to his face that he needed to do things otherwise, and so on. Here, see for yourself.
Now since Haaretz never thought Obama was making any mistakes unless perhaps that he wasn't being forceful enough against Israel, it's easy to see why they'd now downplay any backtracking he might make. Yet the downplaying didn't happen in their Hebrew side - perhaps because they knew the meeting was going to make front-page news in some of the Hebrew-language newspapers, as it indeed did.
I wish I could cancel my subscription to the paper, but we already have.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Calling All Geeks
Every now and then my professional life seeps over here to the blog. Not often. However, at the moment we're looking for a person with a certain set of abilities, and it occurs to me to put the notice up here, also. If you don't know any geeks in Israel, no need to read further. However, if you do, and you think the following gibberish would interest them, please forward it, and have them contact me at yaacov dot lozowick at yahoo dot com; I'll get back to them from the real address.
A wizard is required to help in final design phase and POC development with web based UI that needs to be top league. Post POC (and naturally assuming success...) lots of work on an application that would be cloud based. The wizard's CV should pass VC's magnifying glass.
A wizard is required to help in final design phase and POC development with web based UI that needs to be top league. Post POC (and naturally assuming success...) lots of work on an application that would be cloud based. The wizard's CV should pass VC's magnifying glass.
Educated Arabs in Israel
Just spent a few minutes trying to figure out how to show tables and graphs in a blog. There must be a way, but I didn't find it. Which is too bad, since I've come across some interesting ones. They come from a publication of the Abraham Foundation, an outfit that seeks to promote equality between Jews and Arabs in Israel. No, they're not radical lefties, they're actually a fine organization with an important goal. The title of the publication is
החברה הערבית בישראל - אוגדן מידע
and it's got lots of data about the Arabs in Israel, from May 2009. The term Arab is from the publication, which isn't troubling itself with the taxonomy, rather the reality.
The theme of Israel's Arab citizens is a political minefield, with endless room for manipulation in whichever direction the manipulator wishes to go - which is why I wanted to show a chart from the publication which gives some perspective. It traces the level of education of Jews and Arabs in Israel since 1961. Since I can't show the graph, here are the numbers:
The median education of Jews and Arabs since 1961:
Jews:
1961: 8.4 years of schooling
1970: 9.3
1975: 10.3
1980:11.1
1985: 11.5
1990: 11.9
1995: 12.2
2000: 12.5
2007: 12.8
The Jews in Israel stay in school ever longer, though the increase has been slow since the 1980s.
Arabs:
1961: 1.2
1970: 5.0
1975: 6.5
1980: 7.5
1985: 8.6
1990: 9.0
1995: 10.2
2000: 11.2
2007: 11.3
The Arabs in Israel stay in school ever longer, but their point of departure was abysmal, and they have almost caught up.
I'd say Israel must be doing something right, but that would be to go beyond the data. In this post I wished merely to present the data.
החברה הערבית בישראל - אוגדן מידע
and it's got lots of data about the Arabs in Israel, from May 2009. The term Arab is from the publication, which isn't troubling itself with the taxonomy, rather the reality.
The theme of Israel's Arab citizens is a political minefield, with endless room for manipulation in whichever direction the manipulator wishes to go - which is why I wanted to show a chart from the publication which gives some perspective. It traces the level of education of Jews and Arabs in Israel since 1961. Since I can't show the graph, here are the numbers:
The median education of Jews and Arabs since 1961:
Jews:
1961: 8.4 years of schooling
1970: 9.3
1975: 10.3
1980:11.1
1985: 11.5
1990: 11.9
1995: 12.2
2000: 12.5
2007: 12.8
The Jews in Israel stay in school ever longer, though the increase has been slow since the 1980s.
Arabs:
1961: 1.2
1970: 5.0
1975: 6.5
1980: 7.5
1985: 8.6
1990: 9.0
1995: 10.2
2000: 11.2
2007: 11.3
The Arabs in Israel stay in school ever longer, but their point of departure was abysmal, and they have almost caught up.
I'd say Israel must be doing something right, but that would be to go beyond the data. In this post I wished merely to present the data.
Haaretz Invents False News
A reader draws my attention to this item in Haaretz today: Israel Rejects Qatar Bid to Restore Diplomatic Ties. Any normal reader coming across that caption cannot but groan to herself: Oy, why do we have such imbeciles in the Foreign Ministry? The only reasonable reaction, you'd think - unless of course you then took the time to actually read the item, which most people won't.
A senior source in Jerusalem said that in return for renewed diplomatic relations, the Qataris demanded that they be allowed to carry out a series of reconstruction projects in the Gaza Strip and to import the necessary construction materials. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman were unwilling to agree to this, he said.Ah. There were ties attached, and the decision was the result of a pro-vs-cons deliberation. That's a slightly different story, isn't it.
In return, Qatar sought to assume responsibility for rebuilding Gaza. It also asked Israel to make a public statement expressing appreciation for the emirate's role and acknowledging its standing in the Middle East.
Deliberations were held at the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office, and a fierce argument erupted between those who supported resuming ties, even at the cost of granting Qatar a role in Gaza, and those who argued that the Qataris had opted for an alliance with Iran and Hamas, so there was "no reason to give them gifts."
In the end, a senior Israeli official said, the issue was removed from the agenda due to American opposition.
Wait a minute! Run that by me again, please?
In the end, a senior Israeli official said, the issue was removed from the agenda due to American opposition.The Americans were against. Makes you wish Haaretz had given a bit more of the story, doesn't it. Alas, no such luck.
However, the Qataris continued their covert contacts with Israel, and two months ago, they made another, similar offer. But Lieberman and Netanyahu decided to reject this offer as well.
A senior Israeli official familiar with the details of the discussions said that Netanyahu was actually initially inclined to accept the offer, as were both Lieberman and National Security Adviser Uzi Arad.
However, the official said, they ultimately rejected it, because the Qataris conditioned the resumption of diplomatic ties on an Israeli agreement to allow large quantities of cement and construction material into the Gaza Strip. The amount stipulated by Qatar was much greater than Israel was willing to approve, he said.
"Allowing such massive amounts of construction material into the Strip, of the sort that Hamas uses to build bunkers and reinforced positions for missile launches against Israel, runs counter to Israel's security interests," he explained.
Exactly as the headline indicated, isn't it.
I would gladly cancel my subscription to Haaretz, but we already have, back when the Anat Kamm-Uri Blau story happened. (Blau is still in London, by the way).
Instead, I am hereby launching the Seriously Idiotic Laughable Lies, Yes (SILLY) Awards. In order to compete, all you need to do is send a link to some news item, along with a malicious caption that is mostly unrelated to the content. I'll post all reasonably Orwellian submissions.
Monday, May 17, 2010
A Growing Rift in the Jewish World?
Boaz Neumann teaches history at Tel Aviv University. His political positions have been at the very edge of Israel's radical Left, the camp which can find nothing positive to say about Israel and empathizes endlessly with its downtrodden Palestinian victims. That was then.
In a recent edition of Eretz Acheret, a popular journal of political matters, (March 2010), the editor Bambi Sheleg presented the theme of the month: Since Israelis are arguing ever less about issues they used to find crucial, it's time for this journal to see if we can't encourage more discussion. One of the articles she published was by Boaz Neumann, in which he described the intellectual path he took back to Zionism.
It's a fascinating article (alas, mostly not online). The author admits what the rest of us know, that the anti-Zionist Israelis are profoundly dishonest about the situation we live in, amplifying Israel's sins beyond any plausibility, rejecting the parts of the story where Israel does anything right, and with a determined blindness to the misdeeds of the Palestinians. I've been told he's part of a growing trend, in which intellectuals of the far Left re-examine their positions, recognize their moral and intellectual dishonesty, and rejoin the national community even while retaining a reasonable recognition of Israel's wrongs. Since the camp he came from was never more than minuscule, such a depletion in numbers and intellectual firepower is significant.
Now, compare that with this:
Jeffrey Goldberg seems poised to argue with Beinart, here, here and perhaps with more to come. I generally appreciate Jeffrey's centrist line of relating to Israel, but if he's going to argue with Beinart about the fact of dwindling support for Israel, I'll have to disagree. The problem with Beinart's article is not that he's talking about an Israel which doesn't exist, though he does, nor that he blames America's Jewish establishment for a failure of the community at large, though he does that, too. The problem with Beinart's article is that he's right about America's Jews, but for the wrong reason.
It's not a growing disenchantment with Israel among young American Jews. It's a dwindling Jewishness. Over the past 65 years a majority of the world's Jews with the exception of the American ones have returned to their homeland. They have returned to the ancestral language. They have created a multi-faceted, complex and extraordinarily rich Jewish culture, such as has not been seen since the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE. They have built a vibrant democracy (and no, it's not under attack), a miraculous economy, and even the secular ones among them have a birthrate well above that of practically all rich societies: Israelis are optimistic about the future and wish to raise children into it. There's also the matter of a century of war, and of course the thousands of things that still need fixing - along with the expectation, based on experience, that many will indeed be fixed.
America's Jews can't be bothered. Three out of four have never visited Israel. Only a small minority make the effort to learn Hebrew. Few try, even without the language, to figure out what Israel is about.
I've long since grown out of the sophomoric Zionism that expects all Jews to pack up and come to Israel. Yet I can't help wondering what sort of Judaism it is that can't be bothered with the most important development in Jewish history in two thousand years, one that was always the central dream.
Back in the 1970s there was discussion in Israel about how America's Jews would soon disappear because of their high rate of marriage out of the fold. For various reasons this theme was then muted, one being the feeling that it was counterproductive, another being the impression that maybe it wasn't happening. 35 years later, sad to say, it is coming to pass, even if in a different form. There are still plenty of Jews in America, but it's not clear what their Jewishness means. Since they aren't very Jewish, it's not all that surprising that they don't have much affinity for Israel; this has nothing to do with AIPAC or the Conference of Presidents.
Before I sign off, a number of quick comments to the article.
1. According to all polls and every electoral result since the 1990s, a majority of Israelis would love to have a peaceful Palestinian state alongside Israel. Not that you'd ever know it from this article.
2. Prof. Beinart seems to think that if AIPAC et. al would confront Israelis about their anti-humanistic ways, the Israelis would change. I disagree that America's Jews have much to teach Israelis on these matters; most of us understand them in their full complexity in ways America's Jews never will.
3. It's also puzzling that he seems to think most Israelis would listen. I doubt they would. Israelis are sovereign, and make their own decisions, right and wrong. Distant Jews (two meanings) aren't really part of the discussion.
4. Beinart himself seems an interesting fellow, with children in orthodox schools if I'm reading him correctly. All the more peculiar that his description shows so little understanding of Israeli society.
5. Not long ago I wrote about how internal Israeli discussions in Hebrew take on dramatically different meanings when translated into English. Beinart's article fits neatly into the model.
In a recent edition of Eretz Acheret, a popular journal of political matters, (March 2010), the editor Bambi Sheleg presented the theme of the month: Since Israelis are arguing ever less about issues they used to find crucial, it's time for this journal to see if we can't encourage more discussion. One of the articles she published was by Boaz Neumann, in which he described the intellectual path he took back to Zionism.
It's a fascinating article (alas, mostly not online). The author admits what the rest of us know, that the anti-Zionist Israelis are profoundly dishonest about the situation we live in, amplifying Israel's sins beyond any plausibility, rejecting the parts of the story where Israel does anything right, and with a determined blindness to the misdeeds of the Palestinians. I've been told he's part of a growing trend, in which intellectuals of the far Left re-examine their positions, recognize their moral and intellectual dishonesty, and rejoin the national community even while retaining a reasonable recognition of Israel's wrongs. Since the camp he came from was never more than minuscule, such a depletion in numbers and intellectual firepower is significant.
Now, compare that with this:
Since the 1990s, journalists and scholars have been describing a bifurcation in Israeli society. In the words of Hebrew University political scientist Yaron Ezrahi, “After decades of what came to be called a national consensus, the Zionist narrative of liberation [has] dissolved into openly contesting versions.” One version, “founded on a long memory of persecution, genocide, and a bitter struggle for survival, is pessimistic, distrustful of non-Jews, and believing only in Jewish power and solidarity.” Another, “nourished by secularized versions of messianism as well as the Enlightenment idea of progress,” articulates “a deep sense of the limits of military force, and a commitment to liberal-democratic values.” Every country manifests some kind of ideological divide. But in contemporary Israel, the gulf is among the widest on earth. [My italics]Israelis who read the foreign press often have a surreal feeling: the reports purport to be about us, but there's nothing in them that seems even remotely familiar. So also with Peter Beinart's recent article in the New York Review of Books, The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment, from which that paragraph is lifted. He's got a number of themes, but his main argument, if I'm reading him correctly, is that Israel is splitting into two warring camps, one of which is ghastly but slowly winning; that young American Jews (unless they're orthodox) can no longer reconcile their liberalism with Israel's actions and thus are drifting away; and that this is a colossal failure of the leadership of American Jewry (AIPAC et. al.) who fail to confront Israel, allowing it to continue it's downward spiral and alienating America's young Jews.
Jeffrey Goldberg seems poised to argue with Beinart, here, here and perhaps with more to come. I generally appreciate Jeffrey's centrist line of relating to Israel, but if he's going to argue with Beinart about the fact of dwindling support for Israel, I'll have to disagree. The problem with Beinart's article is not that he's talking about an Israel which doesn't exist, though he does, nor that he blames America's Jewish establishment for a failure of the community at large, though he does that, too. The problem with Beinart's article is that he's right about America's Jews, but for the wrong reason.
It's not a growing disenchantment with Israel among young American Jews. It's a dwindling Jewishness. Over the past 65 years a majority of the world's Jews with the exception of the American ones have returned to their homeland. They have returned to the ancestral language. They have created a multi-faceted, complex and extraordinarily rich Jewish culture, such as has not been seen since the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE. They have built a vibrant democracy (and no, it's not under attack), a miraculous economy, and even the secular ones among them have a birthrate well above that of practically all rich societies: Israelis are optimistic about the future and wish to raise children into it. There's also the matter of a century of war, and of course the thousands of things that still need fixing - along with the expectation, based on experience, that many will indeed be fixed.
America's Jews can't be bothered. Three out of four have never visited Israel. Only a small minority make the effort to learn Hebrew. Few try, even without the language, to figure out what Israel is about.
I've long since grown out of the sophomoric Zionism that expects all Jews to pack up and come to Israel. Yet I can't help wondering what sort of Judaism it is that can't be bothered with the most important development in Jewish history in two thousand years, one that was always the central dream.
Back in the 1970s there was discussion in Israel about how America's Jews would soon disappear because of their high rate of marriage out of the fold. For various reasons this theme was then muted, one being the feeling that it was counterproductive, another being the impression that maybe it wasn't happening. 35 years later, sad to say, it is coming to pass, even if in a different form. There are still plenty of Jews in America, but it's not clear what their Jewishness means. Since they aren't very Jewish, it's not all that surprising that they don't have much affinity for Israel; this has nothing to do with AIPAC or the Conference of Presidents.
Before I sign off, a number of quick comments to the article.
1. According to all polls and every electoral result since the 1990s, a majority of Israelis would love to have a peaceful Palestinian state alongside Israel. Not that you'd ever know it from this article.
2. Prof. Beinart seems to think that if AIPAC et. al would confront Israelis about their anti-humanistic ways, the Israelis would change. I disagree that America's Jews have much to teach Israelis on these matters; most of us understand them in their full complexity in ways America's Jews never will.
3. It's also puzzling that he seems to think most Israelis would listen. I doubt they would. Israelis are sovereign, and make their own decisions, right and wrong. Distant Jews (two meanings) aren't really part of the discussion.
4. Beinart himself seems an interesting fellow, with children in orthodox schools if I'm reading him correctly. All the more peculiar that his description shows so little understanding of Israeli society.
5. Not long ago I wrote about how internal Israeli discussions in Hebrew take on dramatically different meanings when translated into English. Beinart's article fits neatly into the model.
The Professor on Generalizations
We had a little spat here a while ago about generalizations and if they're good or bad. Jay Adler now tackles the issue in a systematic and orderly way. Fortunately, he also is mostly on my side - so that's taken care of.
Stopping Fellows at the Border
Noam Chomsky was denied entry to Israel yesterday. According to him, this was because he intended to talk only to Palestinians, not Israelis. According to an Israeli official in the Ministry of the Interior, it was a bureaucratic cock-up. Knowing the ministry, I tend to believe the cock-up version. The other one doesn't make any sense: we are so eager to have Chomsky talk to us that we'd bar his entry if he doesn't? Why? He's totally predictable, and will always say how nasty we are, so we'd bar his entry for not talking to us? Huh? Anyway, as I often like to ask: how could he possibly know what some Israeli authority was thinking (assuming it was thinking at all)? For that you'd have to have access to its thought process, or documentation, or some window into its innards - which he doesn't have.
It sounds to me like Chomsky is being his usual self, making outlandish statements shot through with faulty logic and false facts. If some Palestinian students wished to hear him, by all means, why should we be getting in their way?
Chomsky wasn't the only bloke whose travel plans were thwarted yesterday by officialdom. Jullian Assange, the Wikileaks boss, had his passport confiscated when he entered into his homeland of Australia. Apparently the Australian authorities don't like his proclivity to splash classified documents with misleading context across the Internet, and they may be trying their hand at limiting his freedom of travel; since he seems to think he's not safe being anywhere permanently, and is always on the move, confining him to Australia must be a severe blow.
Now imagine if Israel tried to shut down anyone's freedom of speech like that. The NIF would go into overdrive, wouldn't it: the end of democracy as we know it, etc. etc.
(h/t Silke).
It sounds to me like Chomsky is being his usual self, making outlandish statements shot through with faulty logic and false facts. If some Palestinian students wished to hear him, by all means, why should we be getting in their way?
Chomsky wasn't the only bloke whose travel plans were thwarted yesterday by officialdom. Jullian Assange, the Wikileaks boss, had his passport confiscated when he entered into his homeland of Australia. Apparently the Australian authorities don't like his proclivity to splash classified documents with misleading context across the Internet, and they may be trying their hand at limiting his freedom of travel; since he seems to think he's not safe being anywhere permanently, and is always on the move, confining him to Australia must be a severe blow.
Now imagine if Israel tried to shut down anyone's freedom of speech like that. The NIF would go into overdrive, wouldn't it: the end of democracy as we know it, etc. etc.
(h/t Silke).
Secret Laser Beam Topples Buildings
This may sound like science fiction, but yesterday's Hebrew edition of Haaretz carried a story, apparently serious, about how the Ministry of Defense operates secret laser-beam communication systems, and that a number of high-rise buildings in Tel Aviv and Netanya can't be built because the beams would bump into them. Or something. The result was going to be that the two municipalities were grubbing for 55 million NIS to pay the defense folks to bury their lasers underground.
Honestly.
Today Haaretz offers the same story in English, only this time it's much less outlandish. Almost boring, you might say. Which is too bad, because the Hebrew version yesterday was far more exciting.
Honestly.
Today Haaretz offers the same story in English, only this time it's much less outlandish. Almost boring, you might say. Which is too bad, because the Hebrew version yesterday was far more exciting.
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